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 From now on I can tell my friends the hardest part of dissertation writing is 
acknowledgements. I procrastinated so much that Norbert and Phoebe laughed at me.  
The thing is, in five years, you’ve had countless interactions with people who care 
about you. Intellectual advances through research meetings, sheer pleasure of get-
togethers, timely support via text messages, and plenty more memories to treasure. 
Distilling all the richness into a few sentences is like trying to describe a 5-way Person x 
Situation x Event x Feeling x Time interaction in three words. How do you even begin?  
I want to begin with Norbert. I came into grad school with no confidence in my 
thinking and writing. Even though I loved big ideas to the point of having Psych Review 
papers as bedtime reading, I didn’t feel comfortable talking to people about my ideas. It 
might be a first-year thing, a culture thing, a language thing, or a mix of them all. 
Whatever it was, I was disappointingly unproductive and mildly depressed. Right there 
the Norbert-builds-me-up project began. He took the time to calm me down and talk to 
me about big-picture issues in grad school, particularly how I could develop a program of 
research one small step at a time. There’s been a pattern since. In formulating an idea, he 
would subtly steer my direction of thinking to refine the conceptual story into a 
theoretically well-specified and integrative framework with much farther-reaching 
implications than I initially thought. In designing a study, he would nudge me to come up 
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with a methodologically rigorous—while intuitively compelling—paradigm that captures 
the crux and leaves out the fluff. In writing a paper, he would give me detailed, 
constructive, and empathic feedback on how to present a strong argument and crystallize 
1800 words into 600 without any content loss, always keeping things short and sweet. 
The best part is that he made me feel like I was the one who had the skills and did all 
these things on my own. Of course I didn’t. But slowly and steadily, Norbert made me 
just a bit more willing to entertain the possibility that I could try and work hard and I 
might not get kicked out of academia. When our first “Lee and Schwarz” got in, I 
couldn’t believe my work actually received nods from strangers (i.e., editor and 
reviewers). No matter the order of authorship, any paper of ours has more Schwarz than 
Lee in it—without the amazing Schwarzian mentorship, Lee probably wouldn’t even 
have stayed in this business. Thank you, Norbert, for all our 3-hour meetings in East Hall 
and ISR and on Skype, for your hundreds if not thousands of long and short emails, for 
your every word of encouragement and wisdom, for your always clear and honest advice, 
for the Friday lab meetings that we all love, for instilling profound learning and joy to my 
grad school experience, for showing me how to walk the path for years to come. I have 
been and will always be deeply grateful.  
I also had the privilege of working with Phoebe. With her spectacular sense of 
humor, I think she could have chosen stand-up comedy as a career. I’m glad she didn’t, 
or I couldn’t have recorded her methods lectures for entertainment and admiration. Thank 
you, Phoebe, for welcoming me to Michigan when I was merely a visiting undergrad. 
Although preferences need no inferences (Zajonc, 1980, see especially footnote 6) and I 
may be telling more than I can know (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), I believe the brief 
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meeting with you in summer 2006 was influential in my grad school preference and 
decision. Since my 2007 arrival in Ann Arbor, whether I was thriving or struggling, 
you’ve always been supportive and caring. Every summer I read and reread your annual 
letters. In my first-year letter you wrote, “Graduate school requires you to do things, on a 
regular schedule, in addition to thinking things.” Great reminder, and it changed my way 
of approaching grad school. In the classroom or in your office, you taught me things with 
wit and elegance. To the former area chair who treated students with respect and did 
things in our best interests, I say thank you—and for the fish painting too.  
I thank Daphna for taking me under her wing when I was just visiting. Without 
the meta-analysis project, I probably wouldn’t have gotten into grad school. I appreciate 
that she took the time to advise me individually and bore with my immaturity in research. 
I also thank Aradhna for encouraging me to explore marketing and showing me the ropes. 
I was supported by the R C Lee Centenary Scholarship throughout grad school. 
But the actual work was indebted to the hard work of numerous research assistants: 
Lauren Davis, Poonam Patel, Miki Savage, Helen Wu; Danielle Ashbaugh, Clementine 
Fu, Alex Goldberg, Megan Hou, Kelsey Kennedy, Kirsten Soong; Christopher Hakim, 
Lisa Hebda, Nishita Jain, Zarina Kraal, Heather Krieger, Lukasz Orzelski, Bethany Pester, 
Haley Rottenberg, Marisa Schorr, Holly Shablack, Samantha Zill; Jenna Camilletti, Josue 
Estrella, Kelly Flanagan, Samantha Futterman, Elizabeth Kelly, Michelle Laginess, 
Garreett Marks-Wilt, Ellie Rose, Amber Samson, Andi Solochek, Palak Vani, Peyton 
Weiss, Genevieve Wang; Jamie Bennett, Ali Beydoun, Madison Kraus, Jatin Sharma, and 
Danielle Smith. I’m particularly grateful to Margaret Cease, Madeline Lupei, Elisha 
Shaw, Heather Burcham, and Danielle Taubman for giving me the opportunities to learn 
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The nature of mental life, especially its relation to the physical body, has intrigued 
philosophers of mind for centuries. It is at the core of psychological interest, too. 
Perspectives varied over the years, and only recently have we been able to make a wide 
range of precise predictions about which bodily experiences relate to which mental 
processes. As it turns out, these relations are reliably captured by the metaphors we use. 
Prolific experimental research in the past few years has demonstrated the diverse 
psychological consequences of embodied and metaphorical thinking. They challenge 
cognitive sciences’ prevailing assumptions that mental life is disembodied and that 
metaphors matter little for ordinary thinking.  
This body of work, while advancing the paradigmatic view on mental processes, 
remains in its infancy. So far researchers have focused on demonstrating the existence of 
metaphorical effects but have done little to explore their empirical complexity and 
theoretical relations to well-established principles of social cognition. The primary goal 
of my dissertation is to tackle these problems and advance theoretical integration. To 
begin, I put the current work in historical perspective by outlining how psychological 
interests in mental processes have changed over the last century. After identifying what 
we know and what we need to know to make progress, I present three papers including 
eleven experiments that go beyond demonstration and reveal some boundaries, 
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mechanisms, and other unknown properties of metaphorical effects. Using the moral 
purity metaphor as an example, I found that metaphorical effects can be (1) conceptually 
generalized from one abstract domain to another (from washing away your sins to a 
broader notion of wiping the slate clean) and (2) sensitive to the modality of experiences 
(“dirty hands” vs. “dirty mouth”). Turning to the something smells fishy metaphor, I 
found that metaphorical effects can (3) run bidirectionally between the abstract and 
concrete domains (with significant effects between fishy smells and social suspicion) and 
(4) be mediated by the accessibility and moderated by the applicability of metaphorically 
associated knowledge. Throughout I highlight the implications of each property for 
embodiment and metaphor theorizing. I conclude with theoretical integration and 












How the mind relates to the body is of major interest to philosophers of mind 
(Dupré, 2007; Robinson, 2011; Stoljar, 2009). They offer no shortage of musings about 
the whether and how of mind-body connections. Descartes, for example, addressed the 
issue by treating mental substance as distinct from material substance. His metaphysical 
view of substance dualism is implicit in numerous religions or worldviews involving 
immaterial entities in the supernatural realm such as souls and angels and demons, but it 
has a problem: An immaterial mind has to somehow exist and control a material body; 
there has to be a “ghost in the machine” (Ryle, 1949). The problem is less apparent in 
Spinoza’s related view called property dualism, where the mental and the physical are 
irreducibly distinct kinds of properties that describe a single entity. By ascribing both 
mental and physical aspects to an individual, property dualism accommodates mind-body 
connections. However, the central claim of dualism—two kinds of things exist and are 
related in some way—left many philosophers discontented. The alternative approach, 
monism, assumes the existence of only one kind of things, either mental or physical. At 
one end of monism, Berkeley’s idealism assumes the existence of nothing beyond minds 
and their ideas. At the other, physicalism assumes that mental phenomena are fully 
reducible to physical terms, hence publicly accessible and objectively analyzable. While 




nature of conscious experience, arguably the essential element of mental phenomena (e.g., 
Nagel, 1974, 1979). For centuries, the debate about various possible relations between 
mental and physical events has been a thorny issue in the philosophy of mind.  
The nature of mental processes certainly piqued psychologists’ interests, too, right 
from the dawn of the discipline. Psychology, after all, “is the Science of Mental Life” 
(James, 1890, p. 1). Unlike philosophical work, psychological investigation into mental 
life has to rely on actual studies and empirical data rather than thought experiments and 
metaphysical claims. For philosophers, hypothetical relationships between mental and 
physical processes may suffice as the judge of the debate; for psychologists, observable 
relationships have the final say. Indeed new research on these relationships has 
something to say about the richly philosophized topic of mind-body connections. As it 
turns out, mental processes are influenced by bodily experiences, and such influences are 
not random, but can be systematically predicted by the metaphors we use. For example, 
recalling immoral acts (“dirty” behavior) rather than moral ones activates cleansing-
related thoughts and desires, and actual cleansing effectively reduces guilty feelings 
(“washing away your sins”; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Metaphorical effects of this sort 
are accumulating quickly (Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010; Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 
2009). They challenge two traditional assumptions in Western philosophy, linguistics, 
and cognitive sciences: (1) mental phenomena are exclusive to the brain and independent 
of features of the body (see Wilson, 2002); and (2) metaphors are merely linguistic 
devices that express but not influence thought (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). 
Contrary to these assumptions, empirical data consistently reveal how mental life is 
predictably influenced by bodily experiences along metaphorical lines. 




metaphorical thinking has been prolific in the past few years, this body of work is still in 
its infancy. Demonstrations abound, but boundary conditions, mechanisms, individual 
and cultural differences have yet to be investigated (Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 
in press). The cuteness and newsworthiness of these effects may also have distracted 
researchers from trying to tie new findings to well-established principles of social 
cognition (Strack, 2012). Recognizing these gaps, my primary goal in this dissertation is 
to advance theoretical integration. To do that, I will begin by outlining how psychological 
interests in mental processes have changed over the last century, with an emphasis on 
social psychology as an area that has always been in some way cognitive. This historical 
perspective is intended to deepen our appreciation of the meta-theoretical significance of 
the embodied and metaphorical nature of thinking. I will identify what we know and what 
we still need to know in order to make theoretical progress. Then, as the main part of this 
dissertation, I will present three papers consisting of eleven experimental studies that go 
beyond demonstrations and reveal some boundaries, mechanisms, and other previously 
unknown properties of metaphorical effects. I will discuss their implications for 
embodiment and metaphor theorizing throughout the dissertation. I will conclude with 
theoretical integration and promising future directions.   
 
Psychological Interests in Mental Processes: A Historical Tour 
How do psychologists study the human mind? Depending on when and whom you 
ask, you would get very different answers. If you lived at the turn of the century, 
structuralists like Titchener (1901-1905) would train you to introspect and analyze the 
structure of your mental experience in its basic components, much as a chemist would 




such as Wertheimer (1912), Koffka (1922), and Köhler (1929) would experimentally 
study the totality of your conscious experience and the organizing principles underlying 
its complexity. Functionalists like James (1890) would also study your stream of 
consciousness, but the focus would shift from its internal structure or organization to its 
functional value for behavior. Freud (1899/1913, 1901/1965, 1917/1920) and other 
psychoanalysts would rather identify your unconscious drives and conflicts through free 
association, fantasy, and dream interpretation. 
In reaction to these paradigms, behaviorism emerged and gained dominance in the 
early 20
th
 century. It rejected introspection as an invalid method; it discounted 
unconscious processes, conscious experience, and thought–behavior relations as 
unworthy topics of investigation. In the works of behaviorists such as Pavlov (1897/1902, 
1923/1927), Watson (1913, 1919), Thorndike (1911, 1932), and Skinner (1938, 1953), 
psychology was narrowly defined as the scientific study of how environmental stimuli 
produced overt, observable, and objectively quantifiable behavioral responses in humans 
and animals alike. It allowed no place for mental experiences, for they were considered 
intractable. As such, behaviorists would leave you with the impression, “never mind the 
mind.”  
Displeased with psychoanalysts’ and behaviorists’ deterministic, passive, 
fragmented, and incomplete view of human capacities, humanist and existentialist 
psychologists such as Maslow (1943), Rogers (1951), May (May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 
1958), and Frankl (1959) turned to the subjective meanings of the whole-person 
experience. They would use more qualitative methods such as phenomenology and first-
person categories to study your free will, personal growth, death anxiety, life meanings, 




interested in the mechanistic patterns of your overt behaviors, humanists and 
existentialists were interested in the subjective meaning of your life experience, and 
neither was particularly interested in the precise workings of your mental processes. 
Things changed dramatically with the cognitive revolution, and mental processes 
could no longer be ignored. It began with Miller’s (1951) and Chomsky’s (1959) attack 
on behaviorists’ severe limitations in explaining complex human behavior like language 
(Skinner, 1957). With the advent of computer science and artificial intelligence at the 
time, cognitivists like Broadbent (1958) and Miller (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) 
likened the brain to a computer (hardware), mental processes to information encoding, 
storage, and retrieval (software). The use of a computer metaphor to conceptualize mental 
structures and processes led the information processing approach to emphasize hardware- 
and software-like mental properties (Lachman, Lachman, & Butterfield, 1979). For 
example, bigger long-term memory or crystallized intelligence, just like bigger hard-
drives, store more information. Better working memory or fluid intelligence, just like 
better CPUs, process more information. And just as computations could be done without 
being shown on the monitor, unconscious processes such as implicit memory and 
subliminal priming seemed plausible to occur without conscious awareness. Rigorous 
experimental tests of these and many other ramifications of the information processing 
approach made significant progress in documenting the tractable consequences of 
memory, intelligence, language, learning, reasoning, problem-solving, decision-making, 
and other mental states, representations, or functions. Neisser’s 1967 book Cognitive 
Psychology gave this approach another push. It would become dominant in psychology, 
and information-processing constructs would formally appear in theories in other areas of 





But Wasn’t Social Psychology “Cognitive” All Along?  
With the prominence of cognitivism, Zajonc (1980a) pointed out, perceptively, 
that “[s]ocial psychology has been cognitive for a very long time. It was cognitive long 
before the cognitive revolution in experimental psychology” (p. 186). More specifically,  
“Cognition pervades social psychology at various levels: It enters at the level at 
which the problem is formulated; it provides significant components of our 
methods and designs; it participates at the assumptive level in theories and 
hypothesis building; and finally, one aspect of cognition—social cognition—
represents a field of interest in its own right” (p. 181).  
 
Why does cognition pervade social psychology? Because our field represents “an 
attempt to understand and explain how thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals are 
influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of other human beings” (Allport, 
1954a, p. 5, italics added). Thought is cognitive. Imagined or implied presence of others 
is cognitive. Also cognitive is our field’s truism that “people are not governed by the 
passive reception and recognition of some invariant objective reality, but by their own 
subjective representations and constructions of the events that unfold around them” 
(Griffin & Ross, 1991, p. 320). Therefore, many variables and processes of interest to 
social psychologists are measured, manipulated, and defined in cognitive ways. As early 
examples, Bartlett (1932) studied how cultural history shapes the recollection and 
interpretation of events. Sherif (1936) revealed how a group’s frame of reference 
powerfully shifts perceptual judgment. Lewin (1936) defined a person’s life space as the 
interdependence between himself and his subjectively construed environment. Numerous 
other core topics in the history of our field—even before the cognitive revolution—were 




Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), prejudice and stereotypes (Katz & Braly, 1933; LaPierre, 1934; 
Allport, 1954b; Brigham, 1971), person perception (Asch, 1946; Heider, 1946; Wishner, 
1960; Anderson, 1962), social comparison and cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1954, 
1957), attribution and inference (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Bem, 
1965, 1972; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973), heuristics and biases in social judgment 
and decision-making (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Miller & Ross, 1975; Ross, 1977). The 
cognitive revolution brought information processing constructs, which began appearing 
in formal models of social cognition, and the methodologies for testing them (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984), all of which continued to gain prominence in social psychology. 
 
The Information Processing Approach Has Its Limits 
While the information processing approach was keeping social cognition in high 
gear and pervading other areas of psychology, Neisser (1976) started criticizing 
information processing cognitive psychologists’ lack of ecological validity and heavy 
methodological reliance on linear programming. This was a decade after Neisser 
published his 1967 landmark Cognitive Psychology, and now he considered the 
information processing approach to be limited and Gibson’s (1979) ecological approach 
to direct perception and information pickup from the environment to be crucial. It 
resonated with Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield’s (1979, p. 9) recognition that 
“[information processing] is not the only approach to cognitive psychology, nor will it 
last forever.”  
Their prediction turned out to be correct. The information processing approach 
did not dominate forever. An important reason, other than Neisser’s critiques, is the use 




too “cool.” It left out important “hot” aspects of mental life. A computer has no need or 
desire, no mood or emotion, no cognitive or metacognitive feeling, no awareness of 
bodily sensation or motor action. A person has all of these things—and they have 
predictable effects on mental processes. That is the crux of the experimental research 
beginning in the 1980s on the causal effects of feelings and goals and desires on 
cognition (Zajonc, 1980b; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Kunda, 1990; Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996). Hot processes influence cool ones. Such influences should not occur if the mind 
worked just like a computer. Of particular relevance to the mind-body problem, if 
thinking was merely computation in a bodiless machine without awareness of its 
subjective experiences and thoughts were represented only as abstract amodal symbols, 
then judgment and cognitive processing should not be systematically influenced by 
bodily experiences such as physiological arousal (Zillman, 1978), head movement (Wells 
& Petty, 1980), gestures (Krauss, 1998), and muscle contraction (Friedman & Förster, 
2000). But they are. These influences cast doubt on the sufficiency of the computer 
metaphor for the human mind and challenge the information processing approach’s key 
assumption that thoughts are represented only as abstract amodal symbols (see Wilson, 
2002). This challenge can be formulated in different strengths. The weak version of the 
challenge says we need to recognize that amodal thoughts receive modal inputs like 
bodily experiences. The strong version of the challenge says we need to reject that 
thoughts are represented amodally; rather, they are represented modally. Which version 
to endorse is up for debate (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, and open peer commentary), but both 
make it abundantly clear that the prevailing information processing approach has its 
limits, that mental processes are not entirely disembodied. Instead, thinking is susceptible 





Embodied and Metaphorical Thinking 
Bodily experiences influence thinking, but can we predict what bodily 
experiences influence what kind of thinking? One approach is to examine individual 
cases, imagine for each case some conceivable mind-body correlations in daily life, and 
hypothesize a case-specific effect. For example, it is conceivable that in daily life arm 
flexion tends to correlate with the retrieval of desirable stimuli and arm extension with 
the removal of undesirable stimuli, so it is hypothesized that arm flexion can elicit 
positive attitude and arm extension can elicit negative attitude (Cacioppo, Priester, & 
Berntson, 1993). This approach seems to have driven early embodiment research in social 
psychology (for a review, see Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 
2005).  
Another approach is to examine numerous cases, identify common patterns 
underlying them, and hypothesize a general form of mind-body relation that is testable 
and applicable to each case. This approach is more parsimonious, has a wider explanatory 
scope and more heuristic value, but of course it requires that we first have a roadmap of 
the underlying patterns. Exactly this was offered by Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) 
conceptual metaphors. It may seem surprising that something as peculiar and 
idiosyncratic as metaphors could be of any help to the daunting problem of mind-body 
connections. Such sentiment was apparent in the traditional view that metaphorical 
language was something of imaginative and extraordinary use. It might be used by poets 
and playwrights to serve decorative and artistic purposes, but it bore little if any relation 
to ordinary thinking. It was peripheral rather than central to routine thought.  




systematic patterns underlying metaphorical expressions and their pervasive use in 
everyday language. By some estimates (Gibbs, 1994), English speakers utter six 
metaphorical expressions per minute in spoken conversation, and they do so quickly, 
effortlessly, and unintentionally. Such systematicity, frequency, and automaticity would 
be unlikely if metaphorical language was nothing more than fancy talk invoked 
idiosyncratically on limited occasions. Through the window of linguistic patterns, Lakoff 
and Johnson viewed the conceptual system as itself metaphorical, where thoughts about 
abstract domains (e.g., morality, love) are guided by the schematic and inferential 
structures of relatively concrete domains (e.g., cleanliness, journey)—domains that 
involve more direct bodily experience with the physical world, that are easier to 
understand, that have greater inferential richness. 
In essence, Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive linguistics analysis assumed that 
“since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking 
and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like” (p. 
3). They drew inferences about the conceptual system “on the basis of linguistic evidence” 
(p. 4), which exhibits a strong tendency of talking about abstract domains metaphorically 
in terms of concrete domains. Their linguistic data were sizeable, provocative, and 
certainly stirred interest (with over 20,000 Google Scholar citations of their 1980 book). 
It led to such recognition as Pinker’s (2007, p. 6): “Metaphor is so widespread in 
language that it’s hard to find expressions for abstract ideas that are not metaphorical.” 
Meanwhile, however, linguistic patterns cannot be mistaken for mental processes; they 
are different things (e.g., Murphy, 1996, 1997). No matter how impressive and suggestive 
the linguistic patterns appear, without experimental evidence the causal relationship 




Fortunately and only recently, experimental research on the psychological 
consequences of metaphors has caught on. In the past few years, cognitive, social, and 
consumer psychologists have garnered ample evidence that concrete domains do project 
their schematic and inferential structures to abstract domains as specified by metaphors. 
Subtle incidental bodily experiences in the concrete domain can unconsciously influence 
processes in the abstract domain. For example, simply holding a warm rather than cold 
cup of coffee leads people to perceive a target person as having “warmer” personality 
(Williams & Bargh, 2008a). Recalling immoral acts (“dirty” behavior) rather than moral 
ones activates cleansing-related thoughts and desires, and actual cleansing effectively 
reduces guilty feelings (“washing away your sins”; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). 
Numerous metaphorical effects of this sort have been documented (see Table 1 and 
recent reviews by Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010; Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009) and 
continue to accumulate quickly. This body of work goes beyond the use of linguistic 
patterns to infer the cognitive validity of metaphors. It provides experimental 
confirmation of metaphorical effects of bodily experiences on a variety of psychological 
outcomes, from basic attention and memory to social perception, attitude, inference, and 
judgment. It suggests that metaphors meaningfully reflect how bodily experiences project 
their schematic or inferential structures to guide mental processes.  
 
What We Know and What We Need To Know 
The embodied and metaphorical nature of thinking advances the paradigmatic 
view of mental processes. It highlights the empirical validity of mind-body connections 
and makes specific predictions about these connections. As such, it challenges two 





Table 1.  Examples of conceptual metaphors, their linguistic expressions, and citations 




Example of its 
linguistic expression  




His reputation is 
tainted  
Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Schnall, 
Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Liljenquist, 
Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010; Zhong, Strejcek, 
& Sivanathan, 2010 
Affection is 
Warmth 
She’s a warm person Williams &  Bargh, 2008a; Zhong & 
Leonardelli, 2008; Bargh & Shalev, 2012 
Intimacy is 
Closeness  
We’re close friends  Williams & Bargh, 2008b 
Importance is 
Weight  
That’s a heavy topic  Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009; 
Schneider, Rutjens, Jostmann, & Lakens, 
2011 
Future is Front / 
Past is Back  
I look forward to it  Miles, Nind, & McCrae, 2010 
Duration is 
Distance  
It’s a long meeting  Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Casasanto, 
Fotakopoulou, & Boroditsky, 2010 
Good is Bright / 
Bad is Dark  
That’s a bright idea  Meier & Robinson, 2004; Song, Vonasch, 
Meier, & Bargh, 2012 
Good is Up / 
Bad is Down  
He’s in high spirits  Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004; 
Crawford, Margolies, Drake, & Murphy, 
2006; Weger, Meier, Robinson, & Inhoff, 
2007 
Divine is Up / 
Evil is Down  
God is the most high  Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & 
Schjeldahl, 2007 
Powerful is Up  Climb up the 
corporate ladder  
Schubert, 2005; Giessner & Schubert, 2007 
 
thoughts are just like computations, represented as abstract amodal symbols, independent 




with little or no relevance to ordinary thinking (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). 
Contrary to both assumptions, empirical work reveals how the mind is influenced by or 
“grounded” in the body (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). And metaphors are not just occasional 
food for thought; they constitute key aspects of thought.  
Although the experimental work on the psychological consequences of embodied 
and metaphorical thinking has been prolific and has made a theoretically significant point, 
it remains an early enterprise. The database has more breadth than depth. Most notably, 
there have been numerous demonstrations, but few investigations into boundary 
conditions, mechanisms, individual and cultural differences (Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & 
Bargh, in press). Metaphorical effects tend to be cute and newsworthy enough to elicit a 
“wow,” but less is known about their “how” (Strack, 2012). More has been done to 
highlight their novelty than to forge their conceptual relations to well-established 
principles of social cognition. Theoretical advances and integration are needed. That is 
the overarching goal of my dissertation.  
Specifically, to go beyond simply demonstrating that “metaphors work,” I ask 
four second-generation questions about the empirical properties of metaphorical effects. 
They are summarized in Figure 1 and detailed below.  
Question 1: Can metaphorical effects be conceptually generalized from one 
abstract domain to another? I use the bodily experience of cleansing to address this 
question (Lee & Schwarz, 2010a, Science). Two studies tested whether the metaphorical 
notion of “washing away your sins” is generalizable beyond the moral domain to a 
broader notion of “wiping the slate clean,” with important consequences for decision-
making.  




in the abstract and concrete domains? I use the “moral purity” metaphor to address this 
question (Lee & Schwarz, 2010b, Psychological Science). Two studies tested whether 
immorality elicits stronger desires for products that cleanse the “dirty” body part than for 
products that do not cleanse it. Answers to Questions 1 (what people can remove by 
cleansing) and 2 (how people want to cleanse) suggest that metaphorical effects may be 
more general in scope while more specific in form than shown in prior work.  
 












(4) mediated by accessibility & 
applicability of metaphorically 
associated knowledge
 
Question 3: Can metaphorical effects run bidirectionally between the abstract and 




Johnson’s (1999) conceptual metaphor theory in the final paper (Lee & Schwarz, in 
press-a, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology). I use the “something smells fishy” 
metaphor to test for bidirectional effects between fishy smells and social suspicion 
(Studies 1-3 & 7). 
Question 4: Can metaphorical effects be mediated by the accessibility and 
applicability of metaphorically associated knowledge? I use an experimental causal chain 
approach to unpack an assumed mechanism mediating metaphorical effects (Studies 4-6). 
Answers to Questions 3 and 4 (whether metaphorical effects are bidirectional and how 
they are mediated) highlight the desirability and plausibility of integrating well-
established social cognitive principles of knowledge activation and use with new insights 
into the embodied and metaphorical nature of thinking.  
Finally, I will integrate the theoretical implications of these properties and 








CAN METAPHORICAL EFFECTS BE CONCEPTUALLY GENERALIZED  
FROM ONE ABSTRACT DOMAIN TO ANOTHER? (QUESTION 1) 
 
Note.  This work was published in Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N. (2010a). 
Washing away postdecisional dissonance. Science, 328, 709. 
Abstract.  After choosing between two alternatives, people perceive the chosen 
alternative as more attractive and the rejected alternative as less attractive. This 
postdecisional dissonance effect was eliminated by cleaning one’s hands. Going beyond 
prior purification effects in the moral domain, physical cleansing seems to more generally 
remove past concerns, resulting in a metaphorical "clean slate" effect. 
 
Hand-washing removes more than dirt—it also removes the guilt of past misdeeds, 
weakens the urge to engage in compensatory behavior (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), and 
attenuates the impact of disgust on moral judgment (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). 
These findings are usually conceptualized in terms of a purity-morality metaphor that 
links physical and moral cleanliness (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999); however, they may also 
reflect that washing more generally removes traces of the past by “wiping the slate clean.” 
If so, washing one’s hands may lessen the influence of past behaviors that have no moral 
implications at all. We test this possibility in a choice situation. Freely choosing between 
two similarly attractive options (e.g., Paris or Rome for vacation) arouses cognitive 




reduce dissonance by perceiving the chosen alternative as more attractive and the rejected 
alternative as less attractive after choice, thereby justifying their decision (Festinger, 
1957; also Cooper, 2007). We test whether hand-washing reduces this classic post-




In individual sessions, 40 undergraduates browsed 30 CD covers as part of an 
alleged consumer survey as if they were in a music store. They selected 10 CDs they 
would like to own and ranked them by preference. Later, the experimenter offered them a 




 ranked CDs as a token of appreciation from the sponsor. 
Following the choice, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated product survey that 
asked for evaluations of a liquid soap; half merely examined the bottle before answering, 
whereas others tested the soap by washing their hands. After a filler task, participants 
ranked the 10 CDs again, allegedly because the sponsor wanted to know what people 
think about the CDs after leaving the store (Brehm, 1956; Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & 
Suzuki, 2005).  
 
Results 
Can washing one’s hands attenuate the need to justify a recent choice? Yes 
(Figure 2). For those who merely examined the soap, the preference for the chosen over 
the rejected alternative increased from before choice (M = 0.14, SD = 1.01) to after 
choice (M = 2.05, SD = 1.96) by an average of 1.9 ranks (F(1, 38) = 20.40, p < .001, for 




washed their hands, preferences were unaffected by their decision (before choice, M = 
0.68, SD = 0.75; after choice, M = 1.00, SD = 1.41; F < 1 for the simple effect). Thus, 
hand-washing significantly reduced the need to justify one’s choice by increasing the 
perceived difference between alternatives (F(1, 38) = 6.74, p = .01, for the interaction of 
time and hand-washing manipulation).  
 
Figure 2.  Post-decisional dissonance after hand-washing or no hand-washing (Lee & 
Schwarz, 2010a, Study 1) 
 
 
Note.  Each bar represents the rank difference between the chosen and rejected 
alternatives, with higher values indicating higher preferences for the chosen alternative. 












No washing                                Hand-washing 
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A study with a different choice task, cleaning manipulation, and measure 
replicated this finding (see Appendix for materials and methods in detail). In individual 
sessions, 85 students responded to an alleged consumer survey about four fruit jams 
(shown in pictures). They were subsequently offered a choice between two jars as a sign 
of the sponsor’s appreciation. Following their choice, participants completed an 
ostensibly unrelated product survey about an antiseptic wipe; half merely examined the 
wipe, whereas others tested it by cleaning their hands. Next, they rated the expected taste 
of the four jams (0 = not good at all; 10 = very good).  
 
Results 
Participants who did not clean their hands after making a choice expected the 
chosen jam to taste much better (M = 8.00, SD = 1.65) than the rejected jam (M = 6.43, 
SD = 1.81), (F(1, 83) = 27.54, p < .001, for the simple effect); hand-cleaning attenuated 
this difference to non-significance (Ms = 7.63 and 7.23, SDs = 1.56 and 1.25; F(1, 83) = 
1.79, p = .19, for the simple effect). Thus, hand-cleaning significantly reduced the classic 
post-decisional dissonance effect (F(1, 83) = 7.80, p = .006, for the interaction of product 
and hand-cleaning manipulation).  
 
Discussion 
These findings indicate that the psychological impact of physical cleansing 
extends beyond the moral domain. Much as washing can cleanse us from traces of past 
immoral behavior, it can also cleanse us from traces of past decisions, reducing the need 
to justify them. This observation is not captured by the purity-morality metaphor and 




psychological impact of physical cleansing. To further constrain the range of plausible 
candidate explanations, future research may test whether the observed “clean-slate” effect 
is limited to past acts that may threaten one’s self-view (e.g., moral transgressions, 
potentially poor choices) or also extends to past behaviors with positive implications. 
 
Appendix: Materials and Methods in Detail  
Study 1  
 Forty University of Michigan undergraduates (25 female) were randomly 
assigned to conditions (hand-washing vs. no hand-washing) and run individually.  
Participating in two allegedly unrelated consumer surveys, they flipped through 
30 CD covers and marked those they already owned and 10 they would like to own. They 
examined the 10 CDs as if in a music store, ranked them (1
st
 rank = most preferred) and 





 ranked CDs as a token of the sponsor’s appreciation.  
After receiving their chosen CD, participants completed a product survey about a 
bottle of hand soap; they either examined the soap (“no hand-washing”, n = 21) or tested 
it by washing their hands (“hand-washing”, n = 19). Following filler questions about their 
lifestyle, they ranked the 10 CDs again, allegedly to inform the sponsor about customers’ 
thoughts after leaving the store. Participants were debriefed and probed for suspicion 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000); no participant indicated awareness of the experiment’s 
purpose. In both studies, participants returned the products to the experimenter after 
debriefing. 
The rank difference between CDs (chosen minus rejected CD) served as 




choice) mixed-model ANOVA.   
 
Study 2  
Eighty-five University of Michigan students (47 female) were approached on 
campus and randomly assigned to conditions (hand-cleaning vs. no hand-cleaning).  
Participating in two allegedly unrelated consumer surveys, they answered 
questions about four fruit jams (shown in pictures). As a sign of the sponsor’s 
appreciation, they were offered a choice between two jars. Next, they evaluated an 
antiseptic wipe, either after merely examining it (“no hand-cleaning”, n = 42) or after 
testing it by cleaning their hands (“hand-cleaning”, n = 43). Afterwards, they rated the 
expected taste of the four jams (0 = not good at all; 10 = very good); this question was 
not asked earlier, avoiding potential problems with the repetition of identical questions. 
Finally, participants were debriefed and probed for suspicion; no participant indicated 
awareness of the experiment’s purpose.  
The post-choice rating of expected taste served as dependent variable in a 2 
(hand-cleaning vs. no hand-cleaning) x 2 (chosen vs. rejected jam) mixed-model 
ANOVA. No differences between conditions were observed on pre-choice evaluations of 








CAN METAPHORICAL EFFECTS BE MODALITY-SENSITIVE? (QUESTION 2) 
 
Note.  Part of this work was published in Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N. (2010b). 
Dirty hands and dirty mouths: Embodiment of the moral-purity metaphor is specific to 
the motor modality involved in moral transgression. Psychological Science, 21, 1423-
1425. 
Abstract.  Abstract thoughts about morality are grounded in concrete experiences 
of physical cleanliness. Noting that natural language use expresses this metaphorical link 
with reference to the body part involved in an immoral act (e.g., “a dirty mouth”; “dirty 
hands”), we address the role of motor modality in the embodiment of moral purity. We 
find that conveying a malevolent lie on voicemail (using the mouth) increases the desire 
to clean one’s mouth, but not the desire to clean one’s hands; conversely, conveying the 
same lie on email (using one’s hands) increases the desire to clean one’s hands, but not 
one’s mouth. Additional findings suggest that conveying a benevolent message may 
decrease the desire to clean the involved body part. Secondary analyses of earlier studies 
further support the assumption that the embodiment of moral purity is specific to the 
motor modality involved in the act. 
 
Water and soap remove more than dirt, microbes, and contaminants -- they also 




judgment (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). These findings are consistent with a “moral 
purity” metaphor through which abstract thoughts about morality are grounded in 
concrete experiences of physical cleanliness (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). In natural 
language use, this metaphor is often associated with the specific body part involved in a 
moral transgression, as speakers refer, for example, to “dirty hands” or a “dirty mouth.” 
This suggests that the motor modality (“manual” vs. “oral”; Anderson, Qin, Jung, & 
Carter, 2007) involved in a transgression may figure prominently in the embodiment of 
the moral purity metaphor, potentially prompting people to purify the specific body part 
involved. While this conjecture is compatible with the core theme of embodiment (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, 
Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005), it has not received attention. Research thus far has treated 
the embodiment of the moral purity metaphor rather generically: washing one’s hands 
(the only cleaning manipulation used to date) is assumed to restore purity independent of 
the specific body part involved in the “dirty” act. 
We explore whether motor modality might play a role in the embodiment of the 
moral purity metaphor, beginning with a reanalysis of Schnall, Benton, and Harvey’s 
(2008) findings. Their participants evaluated six moral transgressions overall less harshly 
after they had washed their hands. However, a closer analysis of the transgressions shows 
that hand-washing had the strongest effect on severity judgments of transgressions that 
primarily involved the use of hands (stealing; hitting a switch to kill one person instead of 
five; typing false information on a resume), with effect sizes ranging from d = 0.61 to 
0.81, p’s < .01 to.06. When hands were not involved in the transgressions, or were 
involved along with other body parts, the impact of hand-washing was weaker (d’s = 0.28 




To provide a more direct test of the relevance of motor modality, we conducted a 
preliminary study by asking participants to recall an unethical act that involved either 
only their hands or only their mouth. Building on the earlier observation that immoral 
acts increase the attractiveness of cleaning products (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), we 
assessed participants’ preference for cleaning products that target either the hands or the 
mouth (as part of an allegedly unrelated marketing study). As expected, participants rated 
hand sanitizer as more desirable after recalling a transgression that involved only their 
hands, but rated mouthwash as more desirable after recalling a transgression that 
involved only their mouth. This observation is consistent with our conjecture that 
embodiment of the moral purity metaphor is specific to the motor modality involved in 
the immoral act. Unfortunately, however, only one fourth of the participants could recall 
transgressions involving only the hands, whereas all could recall transgressions involving 
only the mouth, which introduces a self-selection problem.  
The present study avoids self-selection issues by inducing participants to perform 
an immoral act (conveying a malevolent lie) or a moral act (conveying a benevolent 
message) in the lab, either on voicemail (using the mouth) or on email (typing it with the 
hands). This design allows us to test several possibilities of theoretical interest. First, if 
motor modality is irrelevant to the operation of the moral purity metaphor, conveying a 
lie should increase the attractiveness of hand sanitizer as well as mouthwash, independent 
of whether the lie is conveyed on voicemail or email. Second, if the metaphorical link is 
sensitive to motor modality, lying on voicemail should increase the attractiveness of 
mouthwash but not of hand sanitizer, whereas lying on email should increase the 
attractiveness of hand sanitizer but not of mouthwash. Third, much as people avoid 




exemplars (Rozin & Nemeroff, 1990), they may not only seek to wash away the negative 
traces of  immoral acts but may also avoid washing away the positive traces of virtuous 
acts. If so, leaving a benevolent message should decrease the attractiveness of cleaning 
products; this effect may also be specific to the motor modality of the moral act. Finally, 
the attractiveness of cleaning products may be affected by the mere salience of the body 
part to which they are applicable. If so, acts that involve the mouth (or hands) should 
increase the attractiveness of mouthwash (or hand sanitizer), independent of whether the 
act is moral or immoral.   
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Eighty-seven University of Michigan undergraduates (53 female, age 18 to 23) 
were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Ethicality: ethical vs. unethical act) x 2 
(Modality: hands vs. mouth) between-subjects design.  
As part of an ostensible study on verbal cues of personality, participants read and 
enacted a brief scenario. The scenario, written in the first-person singular, asked them to 
imagine being a junior partner in a law firm, up for promotion and competing with a 
colleague named Chris (cf. Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006, Study 2). Chris has lost an 
important document, which might jeopardize his case and hence his chance of promotion. 
The boss asked everyone to look for the document. Participants imagined finding the 
document in a file drawer, realizing that helping Chris would threaten their own career. 
At this point, the scenario manipulated modality and ethicality by asking participants to 
leave Chris a voicemail (involving the mouth) or to write him an email (involving the 




cabinets and could not find his document” (unethical) or “as you looked through the 
cabinet, you found his document” (ethical). Participants actually called Chris and left a 
voicemail or sent him an email, allegedly providing verbal data in spoken or written 
format for the personality analysis that served as the cover story.  
Next, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated marketing questionnaire. 
They saw a list of consumer products with picture and name, rated each product’s 
desirability (1 = completely undesirable, 7 = completely desirable), and reported how 
much they were willing to pay (WTP) for it in an open response format. The two 
products of interest, embedded among fillers, were mouthwash and hand sanitizer. 
Finally, participants were funnel-debriefed (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 
1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000); no participant indicated suspicion about the true 
purpose of the experiment. 
 
Analyses 
WTP data were positively skewed and log-transformed (Maxwell & Delaney, 
2004). Desirability and log-transformed WTP data were standardized and submitted to a 
2 (Ethicality: ethical vs. unethical) x 2 (Modality: hands vs. mouth) x 2 (Product: hand 
sanitizer vs. mouthwash) x 2 (Measure: desirability vs. WTP) mixed ANOVA. The last 
two factors were within-subjects. 
 
Results  
Indicating a significant role of motor modality, an Ethicality x Modality x Product 
interaction emerged, F(1, 81) = 10.29, p = .002, prep = .98. This interaction was not 




averaged to form an evaluation index, with higher values indicating higher desirability 
and WTP. 
As predicted, participants who had acted malevolently to their colleague in order 
to advance their own career (Figure 3a) evaluated mouthwash more positively after 
telling the lie on voicemail (M = 0.21, SD = 0.72) than after typing it on email (M = -0.26, 
SD = 0.94), F(1, 81) = 2.93, one-tailed p = .03, prep = .91, d = 0.55. Conversely, they 
evaluated hand sanitizer more positively after typing the lie on email (M = 0.31, SD = 
0.76) than after telling it on voicemail (M = -0.12, SD = 0.86), F(1, 81) = 3.25, one-tailed 
p = .04, prep = .90, d = 0.53. These effects are reflected in a significant Modality x Product 
simple interaction under unethical conditions, F(1, 81) = 7.45, p = .008, prep = .96. 
Participants who had acted benevolently to their colleague at the risk of hurting 
their own career (Figure 3b) evaluated hand sanitizer less positively after telling the truth 
on email (M =     -0.33, SD = 0.82) than after doing so on voicemail (M = 0.23, SD = 
0.70), F(1, 81) = 5.02, p = .03, prep = .91, d = 0.74. However, motor modality had no 
effect on their evaluation of mouthwash, F < 1. These effects are reflected in a marginally 
significant Modality x Product simple interaction under ethical conditions, F(1, 81) = 
3.29, p = .07, prep = .85. 
Finally, simply using a body part (mouth or hands) did not increase the 
attractiveness of the corresponding cleaning product, as there was no significant Modality 






Figure 3.  Evaluation of mouthwash and hand sanitizer as a function of the motor 




Note.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Discussion 
 The present findings converge with our reanalysis of Schnall et al.’s (2008) 




























of the moral purity metaphor is specific to the motor modality involved in the act. First, 
participants who enacted an immoral act primarily wanted to clean the “dirty” body part 
(Figure 3a). Second, this motor modality effect under unethical conditions is not driven 
by the mere salience of the respective body part; if it were, ethical acts should similarly 
increase the desire for applicable cleaning products, which was not the case. Instead, third, 
enacting a moral act left participants’ desire for mouthwash unaffected and selectively 
decreased their desire for hand sanitizer when their virtuous deed involved the use of 
hands (Figure 3b).  
 
Grounded Cognition and the Specificity of Embodiment 
Abstract thoughts about morality are metaphorically grounded in concrete 
experiences with physical cleanliness (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). Natural language 
use suggests that this grounding often implies a specific body part (“dirty hands”, “dirty 
mouth”). To the extent that a moral transgression involves a specific motor modality, it 
selectively increases the desire to clean the respective body part. Moreover, our 
reanalysis of Schnall et al.’s (2008) data suggests that people’s moral judgments of others’ 
transgressions are most strongly affected when they have cleansed the specific body part 
involved in the described act. Following this logic, immoral acts in one’s environment 
may increase the desire to clean the external world, consistent with metaphorical 
references to “dirty business”, “dirty politics” or “dirty money”.  Zhong and Liljenquist 
(2006, Study 2) had participants copy a story about an immoral other (the unethical 
scenario of the present study). Their manipulation did not require participants to enact the 
scenario and thus did not imply any unethical acts or motives of the participants 




products (average d = 1.00), a reanalysis shows stronger effects on products that clean the 
external world (Tide detergent, d = 1.15; Lysol disinfectant, d = 0.75) than on products 
that clean one’s own body (Dove soap, d = 0.37). The specificity observed across these 
studies is compatible with the logic of metaphorical grounding (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) 
and embodiment (Barsalou et al., 2003); it has theoretical and empirical implications for 
moral thought, magical thinking, and priming.  
 
Morality and Magical Thinking  
The desire to wash away one’s guilt, and the efficacy of doing so (Zhong & 
Liljenquest, 2006, Study 4), entails magical thinking: immoral acts leave a (metaphorical) 
residue of impurity that can be cleansed away. Moreover, this residue is seen as 
contagious and people avoid contact with possessions of immoral others (Rozin & 
Nemeroff, 1990); conversely, they seek contact with possessions of awe-inspiring figures 
and prefer their possessions with the residue maintained rather than washed away (Bloom, 
2009). Such observations raise the possibility that actors may also avoid removing the 
(metaphorical) residue of their own positive deeds. Suggestively, participants in our 
experiment showed weaker desires for cleaning products under the ethical conditions, 
although only one of two products was affected. Future research may fruitfully address 
the conditions under which doing good leaves positive residues that people may avoid 
washing away.  
Ongoing work further indicates that the power of cleaning behavior extends 
beyond the moral domain. Washing one’s hands can eliminate traces of past events that 
have no moral connotations. For example, it can wash away the cognitive dissonance that 




attenuate the impact of past streaks of good or bad luck (Xu, Zwick, & Schwarz, 2012). 
These findings suggest that people may not only wash their hands of past moral 
transgressions, but may more generally attempt to reap the psychological benefits of 
cleanliness whenever a “clean slate” seems desirable. 
 
Embodied Metaphors and the Power of Priming Procedures 
Many abstract concepts are comprehended and represented as embodied 
metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and a growing number of studies illustrates the 
impact of physical attributes such as temperature (Williams & Bargh, 2008a; Zhong & 
Leonardelli, 2008), weight (Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009), and physical distance 
(Williams & Bargh, 2008b) on judgments of metaphorically related psychological 
attributes such as affection, importance, and social distance. While the accumulating 
findings (for a review, see Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009) challenge approaches that 
conceptualize the context dependency of human judgment within amodal models of 
knowledge representation and activation (for reviews see Förster & Liberman, 2007; 
Higgins, 1996), the predictive power of an embodied approach may be enhanced by 
paying closer attention to the motor modality involved in a given act. For example, 
contextual influences should be stronger when the motor modality of the independent 
variable matches rather than mismatches the motor modality of the dependent variable. In 
a seminal study, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) used a scrambled sentence task to 
prime participants with rudeness or politeness concepts and found that rudeness-primed 
participants were faster to interrupt others. Would such effects be more pronounced if the 
motor modality of the priming procedure (e.g., pronouncing the scrambled sentences vs. 




pressing an alarm button)? Exploring such possibilities may advance our understanding 
of the role of motor modality in embodied cognition beyond the morality domain 











CAN METAPHORICAL EFFECTS RUN BIDIRECTIONALLY BETWEEN THE 
ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE DOMAINS? (QUESTION 3)  
CAN METAPHORICAL EFFECTS BE MEDIATED BY THE ACCESSIBILITY 
AND MODERATED BY THE APPLICABILITY OF METAPHORICALLY 
ASSOCIATED KNOWLEDGE? (QUESTION 4) 
 
Note.  This work was published in Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N. (in press-a). 
Bidirectionality, mediation, and moderation of metaphorical effects: The embodiment of 
social suspicion and fishy smells. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 
 Abstract.  Metaphorical effects are commonly assumed to be unidirectional, 
running from concrete to abstract domains but not vice versa. Noting that metaphorical 
effects are often found to be bidirectional, we explore how they may be mediated and 
moderated according to the principles of knowledge accessibility and applicability. Using 
the example of “something smells fishy” (a metaphorical expression of social suspicion), 
seven experiments tested for the behavioral effects of fishy smells on social suspicion 
among English speakers, the reversed effects of suspicion on smell labeling and detection, 
and the underlying mechanism. Incidental exposure to fishy smells induced suspicion and 
undermined cooperation in trust-based economic exchanges in a trust game (Study 1) and 
a public goods game (Study 2). Socially induced suspicion enhanced the correct labeling 
of fishy smells, but not other smells (Studies 3a-c), an effect that could be mediated by 
the accessibility and moderated by the applicability of metaphorically associated concepts 




fishy smells (Study 7). Bidirectionality, mediation, and moderation of metaphorical 
effects have important theoretical implications for integrating known wisdom from social 
cognition with new insights into the embodied and metaphorical nature of human 
thinking. These findings also highlight the need for exploring the cultural variability and 
origin of metaphorical knowledge. 
 
Many constructs in social cognition are metaphorical. For example, a friendly 
person has a warm personality; a powerful CEO is high up in the hierarchy; a moral 
figure has clean hands and a pure heart. Warm, high, and clean are but a few examples of 
a wide variety of terms with both physical and psychological referents. Decades ago Asch 
(1955, 1958) noted the dual and metaphorical nature of physical experiences, but 
systematic investigation into their psychological consequences has only recently come to 
the fore. This work was motivated by conceptual metaphor theory in cognitive linguistics 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and has gained momentum in the past few years, showcasing 
numerous novel phenomena: Holding a warm cup of coffee promotes affectionate 
behavior (Williams & Bargh, 2008a), presenting targets in high location makes them look 
powerful (Schubert, 2005), and cleaning one’s hands restores one’s sense of moral purity 
(Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). These metaphorical effects were surprising at first, but with 
accumulating evidence they now seem to be recognized as the rule, not the exception. 
A common assumption about metaphorical effects is their unidirectional nature. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 112) made this point plainly: “there is directionality in 
metaphor…. Specifically, we tend to structure the less concrete and inherently vaguer 
concepts (like those for the emotions) in terms of more concrete concepts, which are 




metaphors research argue that “early sensorimotor experiences serve as the foundation 
for the later development of more abstract concepts and goals” (Williams, Huang, & 
Bargh, 2009, p. 1257). In the most recent and comprehensive review of the psychological 
consequences of conceptual metaphors, Landau, Meier, and Keefer (2010, p. 1052) 
remarked, “Cognitive linguists stress that… metaphorical mappings between dissimilar 
concepts tend to go in the direction of a concrete source concept to a relatively more 
abstract target concept, but not the other way around.” These observations lead one to 
expect that in a conceptual metaphor the concrete domain should affect the abstract 
domain, but not vice versa. 
In stark contrast to this interpretation, behavioral research on conceptual 
metaphors consistently reveals bidirectional effects. Most studies in this literature 
examine either concrete-to-abstract or abstract-to-concrete effects but not both, so 
bidirectionality only becomes obvious when separate studies are juxtaposed. For example, 
physical temperature influences interpersonal affection (Williams & Bargh, 2008a); 
conversely, social exclusion changes estimates of physical temperature and desires for 
warm beverages (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). Vertical movement or location in physical 
space influence perception of power relations (Schubert, 2005); conversely, knowledge 
about power relations changes estimates of vertical location (Giessner & Schubert, 2007). 
Physical cleanliness influences moral judgment and behavior (Liljenquist, Zhong, & 
Galinsky, 2010; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010); 
conversely, moral thought and behavior change desires for cleaning products (Lee & 
Schwarz, 2010b; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Similar bidirectional effects have been 
found between weight and importance (Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009; Schneider 




Murphy, 2006; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Weger, Meier, Robinson, & Inhoff, 2007), and 
more.  
How can we account for such consistent bidirectional effects? And why does the 
issue matter? We begin by reviewing current opinions and identifying several common 
confusions. Clarifying them casts new light on bidirectional effects and their theoretical 
implications for conceptual metaphor theory. From conceptual metaphor theory, the fluid 
nature of perception, and the embodied nature of cognition, we derive predictions about 
how metaphorical effects may be bidirectional, mediated, moderated, and manifest even 
in perceptual sensitivity. We tested these predictions in seven experiments with the 
“something smells fishy” metaphor, which links a specific olfactory perception and social 
suspicion.  
 
Why Is Directionality Important? 
The social psychological literature on metaphors has some scattered but 
interesting discussion about the issue of directionality. A metaphorical effect is 
considered bidirectional if (a) manipulation of the concrete domain affects measurement 
in the abstract domain (concrete-to-abstract) and (b) manipulation of the abstract domain 
affects measurement in the concrete domain (abstract-to-concrete). A metaphorical effect 
is considered unidirectional if either (a) or (b) is true. Notably, the common assumption is 
that (a) should occur and (b) should not. That is probably why Williams, Huang, and 
Bargh (2009, p. 1263) used the term “reverse directionality” in describing these two 
findings: recalling one’s immoral behavior increases the accessibility of cleansing-related 
concepts and the desire for cleaning products (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006); psychological 




to-concrete effects. More abstract-to-concrete effects appeared in the review by Landau et 
al. (2010), who pointed out in a footnote (p. 1052), “These findings raise questions about 
whether, when, and how metaphors operate bidirectionally. These questions cannot be 
adequately addressed in this article given the available evidence.” This point, however, 
was taken up by IJzerman and Koole (2011, p. 356), who commented that bidirectional 
effects (e.g., between temperature and affection; IJzerman & Semin, 2010; Zhong & 
Leonardelli, 2008) “make little sense if one assumes that conceptual metaphors function 
like schemas” but “can be easily handled by grounded cognition theories (e.g., Barsalou, 
1999, 2008)… and there is no need to postulate asymmetrical influence between 
metaphorically related domains.”  
The same point was made by Schneider, Rutjens, Jostmann, and Lakens (2011). 
Finding that manipulating a book’s perceived importance changed its estimated weight, 
they suggested (p. 477) “the present findings seem to render an explanation from a 
metaphor-enriched perspective implausible because it is inconsistent with the claim that 
physical sensations (i.e., weight) always serve as the source domain, whereas abstract 
conceptualizations (i.e., importance) serve as the target domain (Landau et al., 2010). 
Instead, the present findings can be explained by an embodied simulation account 
(Barsalou, 2008). According to this perspective, the abstract concept (i.e., importance) is 
grounded in related bodily states (i.e., feeling weight). Because abstract knowledge and 
simulations of bodily states are closely intertwined, their activation co-occurs irrespective 
of the direction of activation.” 
With these challenges, Landau, Keefer, and Meier (2011, p. 364) concurred: 
“IJzerman and Koole (2011) correctly pointed out that the issue of mapping direction 




abandoning consideration of metaphor, whereas we hold out the hope that future research 
can resolve this issue while preserving the benefits of a metaphor-enriched perspective on 
social cognition.” Clearly the cited authors differ in their sentiments, but they share the 
assumption that bidirectional effects pose a real challenge to conceptual metaphor theory. 
Is this assumption valid?  
 
Bidirectionality in Conceptual Metaphor Theory  
Lakoff and Johnson offered the most detailed version of conceptual metaphor 
theory in their 1999 book Philosophy in the Flesh. A careful reading of it suggests that 
bidirectionality is not nearly as detrimental to the theory as commonly assumed. Their 
framework for the emergence and operation of a primary metaphor (pp. 46-56) can be 
summarized as follows: Early life experience involves repeated conflations between the 
concrete and abstract domains. For example, mom holds you, and you feel warm, both 
physically and socially. Such experiential correlation causes neural coactivation of the 
concrete and abstract domains, which builds up cross-domain neural connections. (In fact 
Lakoff and Johnson only had neural models but not biological data to back up their claim 
of neural connections. Nevertheless, that is their assumption.) Cross-domain neural 
connections are supposed to provide the biological foundation for the cross-domain 
conceptual structure, which they call a conceptual metaphor. Within a conceptual 
metaphor, the concrete domain projects its image-schematic, motor-schematic, and 
inferential structures onto the abstract domain to make sense of it, guide inferences in it, 
or construct new meanings about it. A conceptual metaphor is not just a representational 
structure; it also has linguistic consequences (how people talk about the concept in 





The mechanism of concrete-to-abstract projection is probably the best-known 
aspect of the framework, as seen earlier in various authors’ renderings of conceptual 
metaphor theory. Note that while projection is unidirectional, experiential correlation and 
neural coactivation are bidirectional. The unidirectionality of projection is assumed to 
result from the nature of concrete domains: Relative to abstract ones, they involve more 
direct sensorimotor experience, are easier to understand and acquired earlier in life, have 
greater inferential richness and capacity. What is understood more directly, easily, and 
richly structures what is less so. Presumably that is why metaphorical linguistic 
expressions generally use concrete domains to talk about abstract domains but not vice 
versa (e.g., Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997). In short, Lakoff and Johnson’s 
cognitive linguistics analysis draws inferences about a conceptual metaphor’s 
unidirectional structure from its unidirectional linguistic consequences.  
Of the many claims made in this framework, three are particularly vulnerable to 
confusion, leading one to expect unidirectionality where it should not be.  
1. Linguistic and Psychological Consequences.  A conceptual metaphor has both 
linguistic and psychological consequences. These are different things. Linguistic patterns 
should not be mistaken for psychological processes because the two do not necessarily 
correspond to each other (e.g., Murphy, 1996, 1997). So even though a conceptual 
metaphor’s linguistic expressions do tend to be unidirectional, its psychological 
consequences do not have to be. Often they are not.  
2. Representational Structure and Online Processing.  The framework focuses 
on distal, long-term effects: Cross-domain experiential correlation in early life experience 




basis of conceptual structures that shape how people talk, feel, act, and reason. It says 
little about proximal effects such as online processing. Even when a conceptual metaphor 
has a unidirectional representational structure, its online processing may not show 
unidirectional effects. The former does not necessitate the latter. Unfortunately, the 
difference between structure and processing seems commonly missed. Some recognize 
that conceptual metaphor theory lacks specification about online processing and thus 
believe that “it cannot make predictions on performance in behavioural tasks of the kind 
used in psychological experiments” (Santiago et al., 2011, p. 46). Our reading of Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999) is a little different, as elaborated in the next point.  
3. Projection and Coactivation.  While their framework does not directly address 
online processing, it does specify two mechanisms, projection and coactivation, that 
produce a conceptual metaphor’s linguistic and psychological consequences over time. 
One can infer that the same two mechanisms are likely to remain active and thus be 
involved in the online processing of a conceptual metaphor. To date social psychological 
research on metaphors has offered numerous demonstrations, but little insight into 
mechanisms (Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, in press). Whether the demonstrated 
metaphorical effects are mediated by projection or coactivation remains unclear. 
Projection is unidirectional; coactivation is bidirectional. It takes little effort to 
conceptualize the demonstrated metaphorical effects through the lens of coactivation. For 
example, holding a warm cup of coffee causes people to judge a target person as having a 
warmer personality (Williams & Bargh, 2008a). This concrete-to-abstract effect may 
occur because warm sensation activates the neural basis of physical warmth, which 
coactivates the neural basis of social warmth, which shifts the judgment of a target’s 




ambient temperature to be lower (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). This abstract-to-concrete 
effect may occur because social rejection activates the neural basis of social coldness, 
which coactivates the neural basis of physical coldness, which shifts the estimation of a 
room’s ambiguous temperature. Whether coactivation is the underlying mechanism of 
this and other metaphorical effects remains to be tested. If so, it would render 
bidirectionality possible and expected.  
In sum, does the bidirectionality of metaphorical effects challenge conceptual 
metaphor theory? Not necessarily, because the psychological consequences of a 
conceptual metaphor can show both concrete-to-abstract and abstract-to-concrete effects, 
which are conceptually distinct from linguistic patterns, have more to do with online 
processing than representational structure, and may be driven by coactivation instead of 
or in addition to projection. 
 
Bidirectionality, Mediation, and Moderation of Metaphorical Effects 
So far we have said that bidirectional effects can occur across metaphors (e.g., 
Affection Is Warmth, Morality Is Cleanliness, Importance Is Weight, Power Is Up, Good 
Is Up). Contrary to common interpretation, they are compatible with conceptual 
metaphor theory because online processing of a representational structure (a conceptual 
metaphor) can produce psychological consequences that are independent of linguistic 
patterns and potentially mediated by coactivation. This dovetails with other perspectives 
that lead us to expect bidirectionality as well.  
First, although conceptual metaphor theory designates sensorimotor experiences 
as “concrete” domains, people’s understanding of their sensorimotor experience is rather 




shown in a long tradition of research dating back to the New Look (e.g., Bruner, 1957; 
Bruner & Goodman, 1947), a person’s current goals and needs, feelings and action 
possibilities, stereotypes and cultural knowledge all systematically affect her supposedly 
“basic” perception (for reviews, see Balcetis & Lassiter, 2010; Gibson, 1979; Niedenthal, 
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Norenzayan, Choi, & Peng, 2007; 
Proffitt, 2006; Witt, 2011; Zadra & Clore, in press). From this perspective, sensorimotor 
experiences and psychological states are in dynamic interaction, so sensorimotor 
experiences should not only change psychological states (concrete-to-abstract effects), 
but also be readily shaped by them (abstract-to-concrete effects).  
Second, higher-order cognition presumably reuses evolutionarily older neural 
mechanisms for sensorimotor interactions with the environment (Anderson, 2010). It may 
be why thinking is action-oriented, situated, and embodied (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Fiske, 
1992; James, 1890; Schwarz, 2002; Smith & Semin, 2004). The embodied nature of 
cognition means that knowledge is represented in bodily states or sensorimotor 
modalities in the neural system, so processing sensorimotor information should activate 
conceptual knowledge (concrete-to-abstract effects) and processing conceptual 
information should invoke the bodily states or sensorimotor modalities in which it is 
represented (abstract-to-concrete effects).  
These perspectives converge in their prediction that online processing of 
metaphorical knowledge structure can produce bidirectional psychological consequences. 
Furthermore, if metaphorical effects result from the online processing of metaphorically 
associated knowledge, they may operate in accordance with the basic principles of 
knowledge activation and use (Higgins, 1996; see also Förster & Liberman, 2007). 




metaphorically associated knowledge and moderated by its applicability to the target. 
And if metaphorically associated knowledge is indeed represented in bodily states and 
sensorimotor modalities, then processing the conceptual information in a metaphor 
should invoke and thus prioritize processing of the metaphorically relevant sensory 
information and heighten perceptual sensitivity to it.   
Our primary goal in this paper is to test these predictions. In addition, we seek to 
extend the sensory modalities examined in metaphor research from the modalities of sight, 
touch, and taste to a much less studied modality: smell.  
 
The Present Research: Something Smells Fishy 
Smell is used metaphorically to indicate suspicion in at least 18 languages, from 
Arabic, Bulgarian, and Chinese to French, German, and Spanish (Soriano & Valenzuela, 
2008). Across these languages, suspicious acts “have a smell.” The specific smell differs 
by language; in English it is fishy. If suspicious and fishy are not just a linguistic quirk 
but are metaphorically associated in English speakers’ knowledge structure, the 
metaphorical association  should have  psychological consequences. We test whether this 
is the case. Addressing our predictions, we further assess whether the expected 
metaphorical effects are (i) bidirectional, (ii) mediated by accessibility, (iii) moderated by 
applicability, and (iv) manifest even in perceptual sensitivity. If so, smelling something 
fishy should elicit suspicion, and suspicion should affect what people think they smell. 
This effect should occur through the activation and application of metaphorical 
associations between suspicious and fishy. Suspicion should also prioritize the processing 
of fishy smells and heighten perceptual sensitivity to it.  




whether incidental fishy smells make people suspicious and undermine their willingness 
to engage in trust-based economic exchanges, specifically, in a trust game (Study 1) and a 
public goods game (Study 2). Reversing the direction of influence, Studies 3a-3c tested 
whether socially induced suspicion enhances people’s ability to correctly label fishy 
smells but not other smells. Studies 4-6 used an experimental causal-chain approach to 
test the hypothesized process of activating and applying metaphorically associated 
knowledge: socially induced suspicion should increase the accessibility of suspicion-
related concepts (Study 4), which may increase the accessibility of fish-related concepts 
(Study 5) to improve the correct labeling of fishy smells but not of other smells (Study 6). 
Finally, Study 7 used a signal detection paradigm to investigate whether suspicion shifts 
the processing priority of fishy smells and sensitizes people to detecting such 
metaphorically related smells.  
 
Study 1: Fishy Smells Undermine Willingness to Invest in A Trust Game 
People are attuned to a wide variety of cues that signal whether to trust or suspect. 
These signals include attributes of the target person, such as reputation (Burt & Knez, 
1996), facial features (Zebrowitz, 1997), and nonverbal behaviors (Bond et al., 1992); 
attributes of the perceiver, such as risk calculations (Dasgupta, 1988), oxytoxin levels 
(Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005), and neural activities (King-Casas 
et al., 2005); and attributes of the context, such as social distance (Buchan & Croson, 
2004), task structure (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998), and risk of betrayal (Bohnet & 
Zeckhauser, 2004). Going beyond these, we explore whether people respond even to 
incidental cues that are unrelated to the target, perceiver, or task, but merely 




make people suspicious and unwilling to engage in trust-based cooperation? 
To test this, Study 1 uses a trust game (modeled after Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 
1995), in which people are more likely to invest their own resources when they trust their 
partners to reciprocate. Study 2 uses a public goods game (modeled after Ledyard, 1995), 
in which people are more likely to invest in a pool of shared resources when they trust 
their partners to carry their own share of responsibility. In both cases, any suspicion that 
the partner may not be fully cooperative undermines the actor’s cooperation. Of interest 
is whether exposure to incidental fishy smells is sufficient to elicit such suspicion and to 
undermine trust-based cooperation.   
 
Method 
Participants and Design.  Forty-five students (mean age = 20.1 years, 22 female) 
at the University of Michigan participated in a one-shot trust game. They were 
approached individually on campus and randomly assigned to three smell conditions in a 
between-participants experimental design: fish oil (n = 16), fart spray (n = 15), or water 
(n = 14).  
Procedure.  While one experimenter blind to the smell condition was recruiting 
individual participants for a class project allegedly about investment decisions, another 
experimenter sprayed 0.5 ounce of fish oil, fart spray, or water in a hallway corner of a 
campus building. The actual participant was asked to be Decision-Maker 1 and a 
confederate was recruited as Decision-Maker 2. Both were escorted to the sprayed corner 
area, where each received 20 quarters ($5) and an investment form with instructions: 
Decision-Maker 1 had the investment option of sending any number (all, some, or none) 




turning a quarter into a dollar. Decision-Maker 2 could return any amount (all, some, or 
none) to Decision-Maker 1. Finally, each decision-maker was told that they would leave 
with the money in hand. Given an incentivizing factor of four, participants should invest 
more if they trust their partner to reciprocate but invest less if they suspect their partner to 
default.  
Finally, participants reported their mood (“How do you feel right now?”; -4 = 
very bad, 4 = very good) and were probed for insight into the experiment’s purpose. 
Materials.  Smell substances were prepared in advance and contained in liquid 
form in 2-ounce spray bottles smaller than hand size so that when the experimenter 
sprayed smells, pedestrians would not notice. Fish oil was prepared by cutting open 
softgels of anchovy and sardine concentrate (brand: Nature Made) and pouring out the 
contents. Fart spray was a non-hazardous objectionable liquid that smells like flatus 
(Liquid Asset Novelties). This unpleasant but metaphorically irrelevant smell was 
included to test the alternative explanation that any unpleasant smell would elicit 
suspicion. Tap water was used as an odorless control condition. 
 
Results and Discussion 
As expected (Figure 4), participants who were exposed to incidental fishy smells 
invested less money (M = $2.53, SD = $0.93) than those who were exposed to odorless 
water (M = $3.34, SD = $1.02, planned-contrast t(42) = 2.07, p = .05, Cohen’s d = 0.83) 
or fart spray (M = $3.38, SD = $1.23, t(42) = 2.22, p = .03, d = 0.78). The amount of 
investment did not differ significantly between the latter two conditions (t(42) = 0.11, p 
= .91), and mood was unaffected by the smell conditions (F < 1), suggesting that the 




indicated awareness of the experiment’s purpose. In sum, smelling something fishy 
reduced investment in a trust game by 25% relative to a neutral smell or an unpleasant 
smell without suspicion-related metaphorical meaning.  
 
Figure 4.  Amount of investment in a one-shot trust game as a function of incidental 
smell (Lee & Schwarz, in press-a, Study 1) 
 
 
Note.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
When people are suspicious, they should be less willing to engage in any kind of 
trust-based activities, whether it requires trusting others to honor reciprocity and return 
benefits (as in Study 1) or trusting others to honor shared responsibilities and contribute 
to shared resources. If one suspects the neighbor is a free-rider, one is concerned about 




in Study 2 to conceptually replicate the fishy effect and extend it to a different behavioral 
economics context, using a two-investor public goods game.  
 
Study 2: Fishy Smells Undermine Willingness to Contribute to A Public Goods 
Game 
Method 
Participants and Design.  Eighty-two students (mean age = 20.5 years, 24 
female) at the University of Michigan were randomly assigned to three smell conditions 
in a between-participants experimental design: fish oil (n = 28), fart spray (n = 26), or 
water (n = 28).  
Procedure and Materials.  Using the same manipulation as in Study 1, an 
experimenter sprayed one of three smells in a hallway corner of a campus building while 
another experimenter blind to the smell condition approached two participants 
individually and escorted them to the corner area. Each participant received 20 quarters 
($5) and an investment form with instructions: Each investor had the option of investing 
any number of the 20 quarters into a common pool. Every quarter invested would be 
multiplied by a factor of 1.8. The total amount in the pool would be divided equally 
among investors regardless of their initial contributions. Finally, each investor was told 
that they would leave with the money in hand.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants exposed to fishy smells contributed less money (M = $2.65, SD = 
$1.27) than those exposed to water (M = $3.86, SD = $1.36, planned contrast t(79) = 3.37, 




The amount of investment did not differ significantly between the latter two conditions, 
t(79) = 1.30, p = .20. Conceptually replicating Study 1 in an investment task with 
different economic considerations, Study 2 showed that smelling something fishy 
reduced trust-based contributions to shared resources, whereas smelling an unpleasant but 
metaphorically irrelevant smell did not. 
Studies 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that incidental exposure to fishy smells 
elicits suspicion and undermines social trust and cooperative investment. These effects 
presumably occur because fishy smells activate metaphorically associated knowledge that 
is brought to bear on the decision at hand—“there’s something fishy” about the situation. 
In both studies, the metaphorical effect runs from sensory perception to inferences about 
an unfamiliar situation and an unknown other’s likely behavior. The direction is concrete-
to-abstract. Does the reversed direction also work? That is, does socially induced 
suspicion make people more likely to smell something fishy?  
 
Studies 3a-3c: Socially Induced Suspicion Enhances Correct Labeling of Fishy 
Smells 
Study 3a Method 
Participants and Design.  Eighty students (mean age = 20.7 years, 44 female) at 
the University of Michigan participated in a smell labeling study. They were approached 
individually on campus and randomly assigned to two conditions in a between-
participants experimental design: suspicion (n = 40) or non-suspicion (n = 40).  
Procedure.  The experimenter presented a rack of five test tubes containing 
fragrance oil or food substance in the following order: (1) “autumn apple” fragrance oil, 




were asked to close their eyes, sniff each test tube sequentially, and write down any smell 
that came to mind. Half of the participants began the sniffing task right away (non-
suspicion condition). For the other half (suspicion condition), the experimenter added to 
the instructions, “Obviously, it’s a very simple task and, you know, there’s… there’s 
nothing we’re trying to hide here.” The experimenter then suddenly noticed a document 
underneath the participant’s response sheet, hastily took it away, put it in her bag, came 
back, smiled awkwardly, and said, “Sorry, it shouldn’t have been there. But… ahem… 
anyway. Where was I? Oh yes, it’s all very simple. There’s nothing we’re trying to hide 
or anything. Any questions? Ok, good, good, you can get started whenever you’re ready.” 
Participants then began the sniffing task and recorded their responses. Responses that 
indicated any ingredient of the smell substance (e.g., fish, sardine, anchovy, in the case of 
fish oil) were coded as correct labeling.  
Materials.  Each of the five test tubes was 50 mL in volume, wrapped in 
aluminum foil, and contained 5 mL of fragrance oil or food substance. Test tube 1 was 
“autumn apple” fragrance oil, containing apples, pear blossoms, and applewood (brand: 
Bath & Body Works). Test tube 2 was minced onion (Meijer). Test tube 3 was “creamy 
caramel,” containing melted butter, caramel toffee, and vanilla (Bath & Body Works). 
Test tube 4 was “orange nectar,” containing mandarin, tangerine, clementine, sugared 
musk, and lemon flower (Bath & Body Works). Test tube 5 was the same fish oil as used 
in Studies 1 and 2 (Nature Made). 
 
Study 3a Results and Discussion 
As expected, participants were more likely to correctly label the fish oil if they 
had been induced to feel suspicious (72.5%) than if not (50.0%), χ
2




= .04, d = 0.47. Suspicion induction had no significant effect on participants’ likelihood 
of correctly labeling any of the other four smells (Table 2 top panel).   
 
Table 2.  Percentage of participants who correctly labeled the smells as a function of 
suspicion vs. non-suspicion condition (Lee & Schwarz, in press-a, Studies 3a & 3b). 
 
  





(1, N = 80) 
 
Smell in Study 3a  Non-suspicion  Suspicion   p 
1. Autumn apple  30.0 17.5  1.73 .19 
2. Minced onion   20.0 7.5  2.64 .11 
3. Creamy caramel   42.5 35.0  0.47 .49 
4. Orange nectar  77.5 70.0  0.58 .45 
5. Fish oil  50.0 72.5  4.27 .04 
  





(1, N = 54) 
 
Smell in Study 3b  Non-suspicion  Suspicion   p 
1. Minced garlic  46.7 41.7  0.14 .71 
2. Cinnamon stick   46.7 45.8  0.004 .95 
3. Fish oil  6.7 33.3  6.28 .01 
4. Autumn pumpkin  36.7 37.5  0.004 .95 
5. Fart spray  30.0 33.3  0.07 .79 
 
Several observations led us to conduct a couple of follow-up studies. First, we 
noticed that other than fish oil, the only aversive smell in Study 3a was onion, and even 
that might be aversive to some participants but not to others. Clearly aversive smells 
should be added. Second, fish oil was presented as the last smell, and the last item in a 
series can be perceived in unique ways (O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012). Putting fish oil in a 
different position would be desirable. Third, we wanted to replicate the metaphor-specific 




To address these issues, we varied the position of fish oil and included a foul smell (fart 
spray) and new fragrant oils in Studies 3b and 3c, added a food-related aversive smell 
(garlic) in Study 3b, and added a cognitive load manipulation in Study 3c. 
 
Study 3b Method 
Participants and Design.  Fifty-four students (mean age = 18.7 years, 35 female) 
at the University of Michigan participated in individual lab sessions. They were randomly 
assigned to two conditions in a between-participants experimental design: suspicion (n = 
24) or non-suspicion (n = 30). 
Procedure and Materials.  This study was included as part of an hour-long lab 
session (see Study 7). We used the same procedure as in Study 3a but changed the test 
tube contents and order. Test tube 1 was minced garlic (brand: McCormick’s). Test tube 
2 was “cinnamon stick” fragrance oil, containing pink peppercorn, clove buds, and 
nutmeg (Bath & Body Works). Test tube 3 was fish oil (Nature Made). Test tube 4 was 
“autumn pumpkin,” containing pumpkin, ground cinnamon, brown sugar, and vanilla 
cream (Bath & Body Works). Test tube 5 was fart spray (Liquid Asset Novelties). 
 
Study 3b Results 
Replicating Study 3a, participants were more likely to correctly label the fish oil if 
they had been induced to feel suspicious (33.3%) than if not (6.7%), χ
2
(1, N = 54) = 6.28, 
p = .01, d = 0.73. Suspicion induction had no significant effect on participants’ likelihood 
of correctly labeling the other four smells, whether fragrant or foul (Table 2 bottom 






Study 3c Method 
Participants and Design.  Ninety-one students (mean age = 20.0 years, 54 
female) at the University of Michigan participated in a smell labeling study. They were 
approached individually on campus and randomly assigned to a 2 (suspicion vs. non-
suspicion) x 2 (low vs. high cognitive load) between-participants experimental design.  
Procedure.  We used the same procedure as in Studies 3a and 3b, and simply 
added a cognitive load manipulation right after the time of suspicion induction and before 
the sniffing task. Participants picked a paper slip from a bag, read the number printed on 
it, and had five seconds to memorize it. The number was either one-digit (low cognitive 
load) or eight-digit (high cognitive load) and was to be reported at the end of the study.  
Materials.  Test tube 1 was “warm vanilla sugar” fragrance oil, containing vanilla, 
coconut, basmati rice, and sandalwood (brand: Bath & Body Works). Test tube 2 was fish 
oil (Nature Made). Test tube 3 was onion flakes (McCormick’s). Test tube 4 was “lilac 
blossom,” containing lilac, muguet, heliotrope, and violets (Bath & Body Works). Test 
tube 5 was fart spray (Liquid Asset Novelties). 
 
Study 3c Results and Discussion 
Replicating Studies 3a and 3b, participants were more likely overall to correctly 
label the fish oil if they had been induced to feel suspicious (58.1%) than if not (29.2%), 
χ
2
(1, N = 91) = 7.77, p = .005, d = 0.61. This suspicious effect was significant in both the 
low and high cognitive load conditions (Table 3 middle and lower panels). Again, 
suspicion induction had no significant effect on participants’ likelihood of correctly 





Table 3.  Percentage of participants who correctly labeled the smells as a function of 
suspicion vs. non-suspicion condition in Lee and Schwarz (in press-a) Study 3c overall 
(top panel), in the low cognitive load condition only (middle panel), and in the high 
cognitive load condition only (lower panel). 
 
  
Overall % of participants 




(1, N = 91) 
 
Smell   
Non-suspicion 
(n = 48)  
Suspicion 
(n = 43)  
 
p 
1. Warm vanilla sugar  54.2 44.2  0.90 .34 
2. Fish oil  29.2 58.1  7.77 .005 
3. Onion flakes  10.4 4.7  1.06 .30 
4. Lilac blossom  4.2 7.0  0.35 .56 
5. Fart spray  14.6 14.0  0.01 .93 
  
In low cognitive load,  





(1, n = 43) 
 
Smell   
Non-suspicion 
(n = 23)  
Suspicion 
(n = 20)  
 
p 
1. Warm vanilla sugar  60.9 40.0  1.87 .17 
2. Fish oil  39.1 70.0  4.10 .04 
3. Onion flakes  17.4 5.0  1.60 .21 
4. Lilac blossom  4.3 10.0  0.53 .47 
5. Fart spray  26.1 10.0  1.83 .18 
  
In high cognitive load,  





(1, n = 48) 
 
Smell   
Non-suspicion 
(n = 25)   
Suspicion 
(n = 23)    
 
p 
1. Warm vanilla sugar  48.0 47.8  < 0.001 .99 
2. Fish oil  20.0 47.8  4.17 .04 
3. Onion flakes  4.0 4.3  0.004 .95 
4. Lilac blossom  4.0 4.3  0.004 .95 






 In combination, Studies 3a-3c document a robust effect of socially induced 
suspicion on the labeling of smells. This effect is metaphor-specific, not observed for 
unrelated smells, and not eliminated by cognitive load. It presumably results from the 
automatic activation of metaphorically associated knowledge linking social suspicion to 
fishy smells. This implies a process that has yet to be examined in metaphors research. 
We explore it in Studies 4 to 6, using an experimental causal-chain approach (Spencer, 
Zanna, & Fong, 2005) to test whether the observed effect of social suspicion on the 
labeling of fishy smells is driven by the activation and use of metaphorically associated 
knowledge. The findings suggest that suspicion induction can activate suspicion-related 
thoughts (Study 4), which can activate metaphorically associated fish-related thoughts 
(Study 5), which can be applied to the labeling of fishy smells but not other smells (Study 
6).  
 
Study 4: Socially Induced Suspicion Activates Suspicion-Related Thoughts  
Method 
Participants and Design.  Forty-nine students (mean age = 19.7 years, 24 female) 
at the University of Michigan participated. They were approached individually on 
campus to participate in a word game and randomly assigned to two conditions in a 
between-participants experimental design: suspicion (n = 25) or non-suspicion (n = 24).  
Procedure and Materials.  The experimenter either first induced suspicion by 
acting as in Study 3 or skipped this step, and all participants received a 20-item word-
fragment completion task. Embedded among fillers, 10 items could be completed with 




were blank in the original). For each item, participants wrote down the first word that 
came to mind. 
 
Results 
Participants induced to feel suspicious wrote down more suspicion-related words 
(M = 5.00, SD = 1.63) than participants not induced to feel suspicious (M = 3.29, SD = 
1.30), F(1, 47) = 16.31, p < .001, d = 1.16, indicating that socially induced suspicion 
activated suspicion-related thoughts.  
 
Study 5: Priming Suspicion-Related Thoughts Activates Fish-Related Thoughts  
Method 
Participants and Design.  One-hundred eighteen students (mean age = 19.7 years, 
93 female) at the University of Michigan participated. They were approached 
individually on campus to participate in a couple of word games and randomly assigned 
to two priming conditions in a between-participants experimental design: suspicion-
related concepts (n = 59) or unrelated concepts (n = 59). 
Procedure and Materials.  Participants were asked to unscramble eight 
sentences (e.g., somewhat was memory I unprepared), using four out of five words to 
form a grammatical phrase (Srull & Wyer, 1979). To prime suspicion-related concepts, 
four of the sentences contained a suspicion-related word (distrust, shady, uncertain, 
suspicious); in the control-prime condition, all suspicion-related words were replaced 
with unrelated words (supportive, own, well, confident). Next, participants did a 20-item 
word-fragment completion task. Embedded among fillers, 10 items could be completed 




the original). For each item, participants wrote down the first word that came to mind. 
 
Results 
Participants primed with suspicion-related concepts wrote down more fish-related 
words (M = 2.46, SD = 1.38) than participants primed with unrelated concepts (M = 1.78, 
SD = 1.18), F(1, 116) = 8.24, p = .005, d = 0.53, suggesting that priming suspicion-
related thoughts activated metaphorically associated fish-related thoughts. 
 
Study 6: Priming Fish-Related Thoughts Enhances Correct Labeling of Fishy 
Smells 
Method 
Participants and Design.  Thirty-four students (mean age = 22.2 years, 16 
female) at the University of Michigan participated. They were approached individually 
on campus to participate in a word game and a smell labeling task. They were randomly 
assigned to two priming conditions in a between-participants experimental design: fish-
related concepts (n = 19) or unrelated concepts (n = 15).  
Procedure.  Participants were asked to unscramble eight sentences (e.g., 
somewhere are they wander going), using four out of five words to form a grammatical 
phrase. To prime fish-related concepts, five of the sentences contained a fish-related word 
(gills, tuna, seafood, aquarium, water); in the control condition, none of the sentences 
contained any fish-related words. Next, participants were given five test tubes for smell 
labeling, including fish oil and other fragrance oils or food substances: (1) “warm vanilla 
sugar”; (2) fish oil; (3) minced onion; (4) “lilac blossom”; (5) fart spray. 




vanilla sugar” fragrance oil (brand: Bath & Body Works). Test tube 2 was fish oil (Nature 
Made). Test tube 3 was minced onion (Meijer). Test tube 4 was “lilac blossom” (Bath & 
Body Works). Test tube 5 was fart spray (Liquid Asset Novelties). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants primed with fish-related concepts were much more likely to correctly 
label the fish oil (89.5%) than participants primed with unrelated concepts (26.7%), χ
2
(1, 
N = 34) = 14.00, p < .001, d = 1.67. This effect was limited to the labeling of fish oil and 
not observed for the other smells (Table 4).  
 
Table 4.  Percentage of participants who correctly labeled the smells as a function of 
fish-related vs. unrelated concepts prime (Lee & Schwarz, in press-a, Study 6). 
 
  
















1. Warm vanilla sugar  46.7 47.4  0.002 .97 
2. Fish oil  26.7 89.5  14.00 < .001 
3. Minced onion  6.7 15.8  0.67 .41 
4. Lilac blossom  13.3 10.5  0.06 .80 
5. Fart spray  53.3 47.4  0.12 .73 
 
In sum, when people are induced to feel suspicious, they become better at labeling 
fishy smells (Studies 3a-c). One possible process is that suspicion-related thoughts are 
made accessible (Study 4) and in turn activate metaphorically associated fish-related 




smells get the boost in correct labeling (Study 6). These findings suggest that 
metaphorical effects may be driven by the activation and use of metaphorically associated 
knowledge. As such, they are governed by the principles of knowledge accessibility and 
applicability (Higgins, 1996), to which we will return in the General Discussion.  
If the metaphorically associated knowledge of interest here is represented in 
bodily states and sensorimotor modalities, then suspicion should invoke and prioritize 
processing of fishy smells. Therefore, it should make people better not just at labeling 
fishy smells, but also at detecting their presence. To test this possibility, Study 7 used a 
signal detection paradigm (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005): Does socially induced 
suspicion heighten people’s sensitivity in detecting fishy smells? 
 
Study 7: Socially Induced Suspicion Heightens Detection Sensitivity to Fishy Smells 
Method 
Participants and Design.  Fifty-four students (mean age = 18.7 years, 35 female) 
at the University of Michigan participated in individual lab sessions. They were randomly 
assigned to two conditions in a between-participants experimental design: suspicion (n = 
24) or non-suspicion (n = 30). 
Procedure.  Participants were given three sets of 32 odor flasks, all 10 mL in 
volume and wrapped in aluminum foil. Set 1 contained nail polish remover, set 2 fish oil, 
and set 3 fart spray. Within each set, flasks contained 5 mL of the specific odor at four 
concentration levels in random order. Participants first smelled a baseline odor for the set 
and then rated their confidence that each flask contained only the baseline smell or some 




presented, 3 = fairly sure an odor was presented, 4 = sure an odor was presented).
1
 
Set 1 (nail polish remover) served as an assessment of comparability between 
participants in the two conditions before suspicion was manipulated. Overall, participants 
were sensitive to odor concentration, and their confidence ratings did not differ between 
conditions, indicating that participants in the two conditions had similar sensitivities and 
response biases.
2
 After set 1, suspicion was manipulated. For half of the participants, the 
experimenter showed no suspicious behavior; for the other half, suspicion was induced 
right before set 2 (fish oil) by experimenter acting as in previous studies and was 
reinforced right before set 3 (fart spray) by the experimenter smiling awkwardly while 
saying, “Umm… no question at all? Good, good, I mean, not that you should have any 
questions, really. So, yeah, keep going.”  
After going through all three sets, participants completed a smell labeling task 
(that is, Study 3b) and finally reported their mood (“Overall, my mood right now is…”; -
9 = very unpleasant, 9 = very pleasant) and emotions (16 items; XX = definitely do not 
feel, X = do not feel, V = slightly feel, VV = definitely feel) (Table 6; Mayer & Gaschke, 
                                                 
1
 Confidence ratings for each odor flask served as the dependent variable in a multi-level model, 
with confidence rating as the level 1 intercept, participant as the level 2 grouping variable, odor 
concentration as a level 1 continuous factor, and condition (suspicion vs. non-suspicion) as a level 2 
categorical factor. Fixed effects included odor concentration (main effect), condition (main effect), and 
odor concentration x condition (interaction effect). Random effect of participant as a level 2 grouping 
variable was also estimated because intra-class correlations were significant for nail polish remover (ICC 
= .200), fish oil (ICC = .181), and fart spray (ICC = .208), Wald Zs = 4.757, 4.490, and 4.584, ps < .001. 
Ignoring significant intra-class correlations would under-estimate errors; taking them into account by 
including the random effect of participant is appropriate and tests hypotheses conservatively (Kreft & 
Leeuw, 1998). 
2
 Set 1 (nail polish remover) served as an assessment of comparability between the two conditions 
before suspicion was manipulated. Overall, participants’ confidence ratings increased with odor 
concentration, F(1, 1671) = 12.05, p = .001. Mean ratings were not significantly different between 
conditions (F(1, 122) = 1.17, p = .28), nor was the effect of odor concentration on ratings (F(1, 1671) = 
2.51, p = .11), suggesting that participants in the two conditions had similar response biases and 
sensitivities.  
Overall, participants’ confidence ratings for fish oil and fart spray also increased with odor 
concentrations (fish oil, F(1, 1614) = 182.45, p < .001; fart spray, F(1, 1614) = 18.16, p < .001), indicating 
that participants were sensitive to the varying concentrations of both odors. 






Table 5.  Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of confidence ratings for sets 1 
to 3 as a function of suspicion vs. non-suspicion condition and odor concentration level 
(Lee & Schwarz, in press-a, Study 7). 
 
Set Condition Odor concentration level  
1 (nail polish remover)  0 1/320 1/160 1/80 
















2 (fish oil)  0 1/640 1/320 1/160 
















3 (fart spray)  0 1/640 1/320 1/160 





















Materials.  Prior to the experiment, new and clean pipettes were used to dilute 
nail polish remover (set 1) with odorless water to four concentration levels: 0 (no nail 
polish remover), 1/320, 1/160, and 1/80 (most concentrated).
3
 In the experiment, odorless 
water served as the baseline. Of the 32 test flasks, eight were at concentration level 0, 
eight at 1/320, eight at 1/160, and eight at 1/80.   
Fish oil (set 2) was diluted with polyethylene glycol 400 (PEG 400) because oil 
was immiscible with water, but miscible with PEG 400, which served as the baseline in 
the experiment. One of the 32 test flasks was broken mid-way through data collection, 
leaving us with 31, eight of which were at concentration level 0 (no fish oil), seven at 
1/640, eight at 1/320, and eight at 1/160 (most concentrated).  
Fart spray (set 3) was diluted with odorless water, which served as the baseline in 
the experiment. One of the 32 test flasks was broken mid-way through data collection, 
leaving us with 31, eight of which were at concentration level 0 (no fart spray), eight at 
1/640, seven at 1/320, and eight at 1/160 (most concentrated). 
 
Results 
Did suspicion heighten detection sensitivities to fish oil and fart spray? Compared 
with non-suspicious participants, suspicious participants’ confidence ratings increased 
more sharply with the concentration of fish oil (Figure 5; Condition x Odor 
Concentration, F(1, 1614) = 3.93, p = .05) but not fart spray (Condition x Odor 
Concentration, F(1, 1614) = 0.003, p = .95). This suggests that suspicion increased 
detection sensitivity to fishy smells but not to an unpleasant smell with no metaphorical 
                                                 
3
 Set 1 (nail polish remover) required the use of overall higher concentration levels than set 2 (fish 




relevance. Furthermore, suspicion had no significant effect on the overall confidence 
ratings for fish oil (F(1, 128) = 0.02, p = .88) or fart spray (F(1, 113) = 0.16, p = .69), 
indicating that suspicion did not shift response bias. Neither mood nor any of the 
emotions differed significantly between the suspicion and non-suspicion conditions (ps 
> .16; Table 6). 
 
Figure 5.  Confidence ratings for smell presence as a function of fish oil concentration in 
the suspicion and no suspicion conditions (Lee & Schwarz, in press-a, Study 7) 
 





Table 6.  Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of mood and emotions as a 
function of suspicion vs. non-suspicion condition (Lee & Schwarz, in press-a, Study 7). 
 
  Condition  
F(1, 52) 
 
Item  Non-suspicion Suspicion  p 
Overall mood  4.50 (3.08) 4.96 (2.64)  0.32 .57 
Lively  2.43 (0.68) 2.63 (0.71)  1.02 .32 
Happy  3.17 (0.70) 3.17 (0.76)  0.00 1.00 
Sad  1.70 (0.75) 1.67 (0.57)  0.03 .86 
Tired  3.30 (0.84) 3.13 (0.85)  0.56 .45 
Caring  3.03 (0.72) 2.92 (0.65)  0.38 .54 
Content  3.17 (0.59) 3.33 (0.76)  0.82 .37 
Gloomy  1.60 (0.68) 1.71 (0.86)  0.27 .61 
Jittery  1.73 (0.79) 1.54 (0.72)  0.85 .36 
Drowsy  2.77 (0.86) 2.67 (1.01)  0.16 .70 
Grouchy  1.70 (0.70) 1.54 (0.66)  0.72 .40 
Peppy  1.87 (0.63) 1.96 (0.75)  0.24 .63 
Nervous  1.53 (0.63) 1.63 (0.77)  0.23 .63 
Calm  3.27 (0.52) 3.38 (0.58)  0.53 .47 
Loving  2.73 (0.94) 2.67 (0.82)  0.08 .79 
Fed up  1.90 (0.85) 1.58 (0.78)  2.01 .16 






In sum, socially induced suspicion sensitized people to detecting the 
metaphorically associated fishy smells, an effect that was unlikely to result from generic 
valence, response bias, or affective changes. 
 
General Discussion 
When something smells fishy, something suspicious is going on. The present 
findings suggest that this is not merely fancy language, but reflects the use of 
metaphorically associated knowledge that has behavioral, cognitive, and perceptual 
consequences. Incidental exposure to fishy smells elicits suspicion about others’ 
intentions and undermines cooperative behavior in trust-based economic activity, whether 
it requires trusting others to reciprocate resources (Study 1) or to share responsibilities 
(Study 2). Conversely, suspicion induced by others’ behavior increases people’s accuracy 
in labeling fishy smells (Studies 3a-3c), presumably because suspicion activates 
metaphorically associated knowledge (Studies 4 and 5) that enhances correct labeling of 
the applicable smell of fish oil (Study 6). Suspicion can even heighten people’s detection 
sensitivity to fishy smells (Study 7). Post-experimental debriefing indicates that these 
metaphorical effects occur outside of conscious awareness.  
The presence of metaphorical effects across all studies is compatible with 
conceptual metaphor theory’s (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) general claim that 
metaphors are both linguistic and conceptual devices. But the more nuanced properties of 
metaphorical effects have further theoretical implications.  
 
Bidirectionality of Metaphorical Effects 




This challenges the simplistic interpretation of conceptual metaphor theory that 
metaphorical effects can run only from concrete to abstract domains. Indeed, empirical 
work consistently reveals bidirectional metaphorical effects—between smell and 
suspicion (present studies), cleanliness and morality, temperature and affection, weight 
and importance, verticality and power, verticality and valence (see introduction for 
citations). Contrary to a common misinterpretation, these bidirectional effects are 
compatible with conceptual metaphor theory because even if a conceptual metaphor has a 
unidirectional representational structure, its use can produce bidirectional psychological 
consequences (Ijzerman & Koole, 2011). These psychological effects are also 
conceptually distinct from linguistic patterns, which typically are unidirectional and 
become nonsensical when the two domains are swapped (e.g., Glucksberg, McGlone, & 
Manfredi, 1997). The same cannot be said of the processing of conceptual metaphors and 
their psychological consequences.  
Bidirectionality is also compatible with the fluid nature of perception. The latter 
has been highlighted by research since the New Look (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Bruner & 
Goodman, 1947) showing how people’s understanding of their “concrete” sensorimotor 
experience is sensitive to motivational, emotional, conceptual, and contextual variations 
(e.g., Balcetis & Lassiter, 2010; Gibson, 1979; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, 
Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Norenzayan, Choi, & Peng, 2007; Proffitt, 2006; Witt, 2011; 
Zadra & Clore, in press). Because sensorimotor experiences and psychological states are 
in dynamic interaction, sensorimotor experiences should not only change psychological 
states (concrete-to-abstract effects), but also be readily shaped by them (abstract-to-
concrete effects).  




neural mechanisms for sensorimotor interactions with the environment (Anderson, 2010) 
and is action-oriented, situated, and embodied (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Fiske, 1992; James, 
1890; Schwarz, 2002; Smith & Semin, 2004). Because knowledge is represented in 
bodily states or sensorimotor modalities, processing sensorimotor information should 
activate conceptual knowledge (concrete-to-abstract effects) and processing conceptual 
information should invoke the bodily states or sensorimotor modalities in which it is 
represented (abstract-to-concrete effects).  
In line the with the predictions based on conceptual metaphor theory, the fluid 
nature of perception, and the embodied nature of cognition, smelling something fishy 
makes people suspicious and being suspicious makes people more likely to smell 
something fishy. Future research may explore the conditions in which metaphorical 
effects are unidirectional—perhaps when the phenomenon of interest is primarily driven 
by projection (of the schematic and inferential structure from the concrete to the abstract 
domain), when sensorimotor experiences are insensitive to psychological forces, or when 
one domain is chronically or temporarily much more accessible than the other.  
 
Accessibility and Applicability in Metaphorical Thought 
Sensory experience in any modality can have downstream metaphorical effects. 
For example, olfactory cues can elicit social suspicion (present studies), visual distance 
can elicit  psychological distance (Williams & Bargh, 2008b), and tactile hardness can 
increase rigidity in negotiation (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010). The present findings 
indicate that the influence of sensory experience can be driven by the activation and use 
of metaphorically associated knowledge. Once accessible, knowledge can affect people’s 




also Förster & Liberman, 2007). The same principles may apply to the psychological 
consequences of conceptual metaphors. Accordingly, sensorimotor experience should 
affect metaphorically associated psychological experience (and vice versa) only if the 
metaphorical knowledge is available to the person, accessible in the context, and 
applicable to the target.  
Exploring these issues will deepen our understanding of both metaphorical 
thought and knowledge accessibility. For example, actual cleansing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 
2006) or visualizing oneself as cleansed (Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2011) attenuates 
one’s guilt and makes one feel morally pure and righteous, but simply being primed with 
purity concepts without cleansing does not produce the same effects (Lee & Schwarz, 
2011). It suggests that for some metaphorical effects, merely making the concepts 
accessible may be insufficient; the action requirements need to be fulfilled. (In fact 
merely making the concepts accessible may even backfire because thinking about purity 
without a chance to cleanse may make one feel impure, a possibility that awaits testing.) 
In contrast, the presence of fishy smells is sufficient to elicit the  metaphorically 
associated experience of suspicion, much as the accessibility of trait concepts is sufficient 
to affect the encoding of person descriptions (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, and Jones, 1976; 
Srull & Wyer, 1979). Why such different results? The critical factor may be what 
sensation or motor action is implied by the metaphor of interest (Lee & Schwarz, in 
press-b). To be clean, one typically needs to cleanse. To smell something fishy, one 
simply needs to smell. Such bodily nuances go beyond the principles of accessibility and 
applicability in the activation and use of non-embodied knowledge.   
 




Knowledge can be accessed only if it is available. If metaphorical effects require 
the availability of metaphorical knowledge, then the psychological consequences of some 
metaphors are likely to vary by culture. As a case in point, the smell that indicates 
suspicion is fishy for English speakers, but unspecified in many other languages. This 
raises the possibility, also noted by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 19), that a metaphor 
may have a universal structure (e.g., smell–suspicion, documented in at least 18 
languages) with culture-specific content (e.g., fishy in English, unspecified in Chinese 
and German) and thus culture-specific psychological consequences. Different processes 
may be responsible for the universal structure and the variable content. 
A universal structure is unlikely to be a mere linguistic accident. Why does the 
smell–suspicion metaphor “feel right” to people with widely different life experiences? 
Where does it come from? While metaphors are generally assumed to result from higher-
order cognition’s reuse of and grounding in sensorimotor processes (e.g., Landau, Meier, 
& Keefer, 2010; Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009), little is known about the origin of 
specific metaphors. One account, based on cognitive linguistic analysis, is that 
metaphorical mappings select deeper properties that are shared between smell and 
suspicion (Ibarretxe-Antunano, 1999; Sweetser, 1990). When people are suspicious, they 
sense something problematic but cannot say for sure what it is; if they were sure, they 
would know rather than suspect that there is a problem. Suspicion thus involves detection 
but uncertain identification. People may or may not be able to figure out the problem, and 
figuring it out takes time. Furthermore, people can become suspicious by involuntarily 
detecting something problematic; they can also be actively suspicious by voluntarily 
trying to detect signals of the problematic situation. These properties are shared by the 




says “I smell something,” it usually means she detects an odor but cannot identify it with 
certainty. Smell labeling and naming are difficult (Buck, 1949; Engen, 1960; cf. Doty, 
2001). Just like suspicion, it takes time to figure out what a smell is, and people may or 
may not find out in the end. These shared properties may be the basis for the use of 
“smelling” to metaphorically express “suspecting” in all of the 18 languages that have 
been analyzed (Soriano & Valenzuela, 2008). Tellingly, every language matches the 
valence of perceptual and social experience by using only unpleasant smells to indicate 
questionable character or dislikeable characteristics.  
But it still leaves open the question: Why is the suspicious odor fishy in English 
but something else in other languages? It could be the result of recent evolutionary 
history, which is capable of generating cultural differences in genome-wide biological 
processes, including smell perception (Akey, 2009). Ecological and social contexts can 
exert “geographically restricted selective pressures” and produce “local adaptation” 
(Ronald & Akey, 2005, p. 113), so different contexts may render different smells relevant 
to suspicion. We note that suspicion arises in social interactions and that odors indicating 
suspicion are organic and usually related to spoiled food (e.g., fishy, rotten). Accordingly, 
our speculation is that suspicion may be particularly relevant to the trading of valuable 
products that are organic, decayable, and smelly when decayed, like fish and meat. 
Encoding such cultural knowledge in language (Chiu, Leung, & Kwan, 2007) might have 
given rise to local variants of the smell–suspicion metaphor that reflect local differences 
in the consumption of perishable items.  
Clearly, empirical evidence rather than speculation is needed to better understand 
the cultural variability and origin of metaphorical knowledge. It would have further 




suspicion is universally and neurally grounded in smell, then across cultures a suspicious 
state of mind may activate the olfactory bulb and other networks for smell processing. If 
a metaphor has culture-specific variants, the same perceptual experience may have 
different—but predictable—effects depending on the person’s metaphorical knowledge 
acquired from cultural exposure. Multicultural people may show multiple effects. Finally, 
some metaphorical constructs in social cognition seem universal (e.g., “warm personality,” 
“high status”, “pure heart”) while others seem variable (e.g., fishy). Examining whether 
and why such difference exists will help impose some conceptual structure on the 










THEORETICAL INTEGRATION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
 
What do we know about the nature of mental processes? We have come a long 
way in this pursuit—from philosophers’ musings about mind-body relationships to pre-
experimental psychologists’ introspective analysis, to behaviorists’ rejection of anything 
mental, to cognitivists’ computer metaphor for a symbolic information-processing mind, 
to early embodiment psychologists’ scattered demonstrations of mind-body connections, 
to current embodiment/metaphor psychologists’ specific predictions about which mental 
and bodily processes are related to each other.  
Psychological theories are valuable insofar as they can describe, explain, predict, 
and control psychological phenomena. The emerging perspective that thinking is both 
embodied and metaphorical not only describes and explains a wide range of bodily 
effects on mental and behavioral processes, but perhaps most significantly, it also 
predicts them. Just a few years ago, metaphorical effects on judgment and behavior were 
novel and surprising (e.g., Williams & Bargh, 2008a; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). But 
now, with demonstration after demonstration (Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010), this first 
wave of research has made it clear that metaphorical effects are real and reliable.  
Beyond this general point, however, little is known about metaphorical effects’ 
empirical properties, less about their conceptual relations to standard models of social 




metaphorical effects can be (1) conceptually generalized from one abstract domain to 
another (e.g., from “washing away your sins” to “wiping the slate clean”); (2) sensitive to 
the modality of experiences in the abstract and concrete domains (e.g., “dirty hands” and 
“dirty mouth”); (3) bidirectional between the abstract and concrete domains (e.g., social 
suspicion and smelling something fishy); and (4) mediated by the accessibility and 
applicability of metaphorically associated knowledge. Throughout the dissertation, I have 
discussed the theoretical implications of each property, such as how the modality-
sensitive nature of embodiment can predict more nuanced priming effects, how social 
knowledge can be activated through cross-modal priming, and how metaphorical effects 
may have culturally variable and universal origins.  
Jointly considering all properties makes another important point. As shown in 
Table 7, all properties cannot be fully predicted by any one of the major theoretical 
perspectives, including conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999), 
embodied cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008), and basic principles of social cognition 
(e.g., Higgins, 1996). They call for a big-picture integration of insights from these 






Table 7.  What the major theoretical perspectives have to say about the existence and 

















Existence of metaphorical effects predicts it is mute are mute 
Property of metaphorical effects    
Conceptually generalizable 
from one abstract domain to 
another 
is mute is mute predict it 
Sensitive to modality of 
experiences in abstract and 
concrete domains 
is mute predicts it are mute 
Bidirectional between abstract 
and concrete domains 
is incompatible 
with it 
predicts it predict it 
Mediated by accessibility & 
applicability of metaphorically 
associated knowledge  
is compatible 
with it but 
describes it in 
a different way 
is compatible 
with it but 
describes it in 




Towards A Unified Framework 
One step towards developing a unified framework is to tie the metaphorical and 
embodied nature of thinking with the known principles in social cognition. Specifically, 
metaphorical knowledge may produce metaphorical effects in accordance with the 
principles of knowledge activation and use (e.g., Higgins, 1996)—with a couple of 
revisions to the basic process. 




knowledge is applicable to a target, it is used; if inapplicable, ignored.  
 Revision 1 (metaphorical thinking): Knowledge association can be metaphorical 
and not just literal. For example, clean and warm can activate the metaphorically 
associated meanings of moral and affectionate. 
 Revision 2 (embodied thinking): Knowledge can be stored in embodied forms 
rather than as amodal symbols. This allows bodily experiences such as cleansing 
and warmth to activate literally or metaphorically associated knowledge.  
The revised process predicts the existence of metaphorical effects and all their properties 
as listed in Table 7. First, metaphorical knowledge association allows metaphorical 
knowledge activation and use, hence the existence of metaphorical effects. Second, stored 
knowledge, including metaphorical knowledge, is not set in stone, but gets revised upon 
learning and can be generalized and applied to novel, related domains (Mandler & 
McDonough, 1996, 1998, 2000), hence the conceptual generalizability of metaphorical 
effects. Third, if knowledge is stored in embodied forms, then metaphorical knowledge 
can be activated by bodily experiences and the activation is sensitive to the body’s 
sensorimotor modalities (Barsalou, 2008; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2004), hence 
the modality-sensitivity of metaphorical effects. Fourth, activation of associated 
knowledge can go both ways, hence the bidirectionality of metaphorical effects. Fifth, 
knowledge can be activated and used only if it is accessible and applicable to the target 
(Higgins, 1996), so metaphorical effects are mediated by the accessibility and 
applicability of metaphorically associated knowledge.  
In addition to predicting metaphorical effects and their properties, a unified 
framework addresses important theoretical questions and opens up promising directions 




below, which I plan to address in the next few years. 
 
Are Metaphorical Effects “Just Priming Effects”? 
As metaphorical effects become increasingly recognized as the rule rather than 
the exception, a frequent complaint I have heard informally at conferences (but yet to see 
in published papers) goes like this: sure, it is cute to show that holding a warm cup of 
coffee elicits affectionate perception and behavior (Williams & Bargh, 2008a), but all 
these effects work just like priming effects anyway. What is the big deal? 
The big deal is that just a few years ago we would not have predicted them. 
Predictive power is a key criterion for evaluating theoretical frameworks. The field of 
social cognition began with the information processing approach in cognitive psychology. 
By and large, social cognitive models treated social thought as amodal symbolic 
information. Another traditional assumption in cognitive sciences, that metaphor played 
no central role in ordinary thinking, led social cognitive models to take little note of the 
fact that much of social thought is metaphorical (Asch, 1955, 1958). Without recognizing 
the (a) embodied and (b) metaphorical nature of thinking, traditional models in social 
cognition would not predict a priori (a) whether and (b) which bodily experiences 
influence which social psychological outcomes.  
In fact, given the aforementioned framework, many of the metaphorical effects 
demonstrated in recent research are priming effects—but it does not make them 
uninteresting. For priming simply “refers to procedures that stimulate or activate some 
stored knowledge” (Higgins, 1996, p. 134). It makes no claim about the nature of the 
stored knowledge or the activation process. By finding that incidental warmth can elicit 




embodied forms rather than as amodal symbols only) and activated (through 
metaphorical association rather than literal association only). These findings add 
substance to our theoretical understanding of the priming process.  
Meanwhile, some metaphorical effects do go beyond the typical notion of priming 
effects. To illustrate, consider that actual cleansing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) or 
visualizing oneself as cleansed (Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2011) has been shown to 
attenuate one’s guilt and make one feel morally pure and righteous, whereas simply being 
primed with purity concepts without cleansing does not produce the same effects (Lee & 
Schwarz, 2011). Apparently, for some metaphorical effects, merely making the concepts 
accessible may be insufficient; the action requirements need to be fulfilled. In fact, 
merely making the concepts accessible may even backfire because thinking about purity 
without a chance to cleanse may increase one’s sense of impurity, a possibility that 
awaits testing. Contrast this with the fishy findings (Lee & Schwarz, in press-a), where 
the presence of fishy smells is sufficient to produce metaphorical effects on social 
suspicion, much as the accessibility of trait concepts is sufficient to affect the encoding of 
person descriptions (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1976; Srull & Wyer, 1979). The 
critical factor to explore may be what sensation or motor action is implied by the 
metaphor of interest. To be clean, one typically needs to cleanse. To smell something 
fishy, one simply needs to smell. An exploration of such bodily nuances will advance our 
understanding of both knowledge accessibility and metaphorical effects. 
 
Do Metaphorical Effects Depend On Subjective Construal of Bodily Experiences? 
As a truism in social cognition, “the individual actively construes social situations. 




1998, p. 58; see also Griffin & Ross, 1991). Complex social environments require 
interpretation of course. But does subjective construal matter even for something as 
concrete and basic as bodily experiences with the physical environment?  
Strack (2012) found that using a sanitizing wipe after recalling immoral acts 
decreases guilt (“wiping it off”), but if the experimenter calls it a moisturizing wipe, now 
the same bodily experience increases guilt (“rubbing it in”). Subjective construal matters. 
In some cases it may even be the primary basis of metaphorical effects. For example, the 
Ganges is a sacred river for Hindus, who consider its water to be so purifying as to 
remove one’s sins of a lifetime (Eck, 1982). Purifying is surely in its symbolic sense 
though because the Ganges is among the dirtiest rivers in the world (Salemme, 2007); the 
Ganga Action Plan “was the largest single attempt to clean up a polluted river anywhere 
in the world and has not achieved any success in terms of prevention pollution load and 
improvement in water quality” (Singh & Singh, 2007, p. 421). Apparently, through 
cultural construction, subjective construal can turn dirty water into moral cleanser.  
The role of subjective construal in metaphorical effects remains largely 
unexplored. Based on preliminary experimental and anecdotal evidence, it appears to 
play a significant role. This would imply that metaphorical effects should be highly 
malleable and susceptible to influences from social goals, self-awareness, pragmatic 
inferences, and many other contextual factors. Metaphorical effects may also be turned 
on and off and in different directions through well-established mechanisms of meaning 
making, as illustrated below.   
 
Are Metaphorical Effects Always Assimilative?  




example, when incidental disgust bears on some moral transgressions under judgment, 
the transgressions are judged as more severe and wrong, presumably because they feel 
more disgusting (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). This is an assimilation effect 
because the manipulated cause and the measured effect go in the same direction (more 
disgusting). 
A prime does not always produce an assimilation effect though. When the 
knowledge activated by a prime is used to inform a judgment target, it produces an 
assimilation effect; when used to inform a judgment standard, it produces a contrast 
effect (Bless & Schwarz, 2010). This logic may apply to metaphorical effects and predict 
that a bodily experience can produce metaphorical assimilation or contrast, depending on 
whether it informs the judgment target or judgment standard. For example, if the feeling 
of disgust bears on a dishonest politician, people may judge him as more immoral 
(assimilation). But if the feeling of disgust bears on a child molester, people may judge a 
dishonest politician as less immoral (contrast from the standard of a disgusting molester). 
Systematic investigation into the existence and determinants of assimilative versus 
contrastive metaphorical effects is a promising future direction. 
 
Do Multiple Processes Exist and Can They Interact with Each Other? 
 As the field is going beyond mere demonstration and beginning to unpack the 
underlying processes, we will most likely learn that multiple processes contribute to 
metaphorical effects (Lee & Schwarz, in press-b). First, incidental bodily experiences can 
activate metaphorically associated thoughts, goals, and feelings to affect how people 
construe the situation at hand. Most of the demonstrated effects in the literature can be 




situation, as when physical disgust intensifies the feeling that moral transgressions are 
“disgusting” and wrong. In addition to this content route, a second possibility is that 
incidental bodily experiences may activate metaphorically associated mental procedures 
that initiate, terminate, or change the judgmental, decisional, or behavioral process itself. 
For example, physical cleansing allows people to metaphorically wipe the slate clean and 
frees them from residual concerns about their recent decisions, thereby eliminating 
postdecisional dissonance (Lee & Schwarz, 2010a). To date, experimental support for 
this type of effects is very limited, but we find it promising. It allows researchers to 
leverage numerous well-understood paradigms in behavioral decision making to explore 
the potentially broad impact of embodied metaphors. Third, metaphorical effects of 
incidental bodily experiences are likely to be eliminated when people become aware of 
their incidental nature, consistent with feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz, 2012) 
and models of mental correction (Strack & Hannover, 1996; Wilson & Brekke,1994). 
This would mean that bodily experiences are most influential when they are subtle and 
escape direct attention.   
In some situations, the above processes may be pitted against each other. For 
example, would physical cleansing eliminate postdecisional dissonance in a choice 
between guilty pleasure and virtuous restraint? If cleansing simply wipes the slate clean 
(process #2), it should matter little what the content is and postdecisional dissonance 
should be eliminated. But if cleansing activates moral meanings (process #1), it should 
affect how moral one feels about the choice alternatives or oneself, and the downstream 
consequences may be more complicated. Which of these processes occur may depend on 
whether people are aware or not (process #3) of the metaphorical effects of physical 




processes are promising avenues for future research. 
 
How to Solve the Multiple Mappings Problem in Metaphorical Effects? 
The same bodily experience can metaphorically structure multiple abstract 
meanings. For example, up carries such diverse metaphorical meanings as happy or good 
(Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004; Crawford, Margolies, Drake, & Murphy, 2006; Weger, 
Meier, Robinson, & Inhoff, 2007), divine (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & 
Schjeldahl, 2007), powerful (Schubert, 2005; Giessner & Schubert, 2007), and moral 
(Sanna, Chang, Miceli, & Lundberg, 2011). Conversely, the same abstract domain can be 
metaphorically structured by multiple bodily experiences. For example, the righteous 
stand on moral high grounds (Sanna et al., 2011), live in the light (Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 
2010), and have a clean spirit (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 
2008; Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010; Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010). 
When researchers test a hypothesized metaphorical effect, what factors or mechanisms 
determine which of the many-to-many mappings is at work?  
To the best of my knowledge, no empirical attempt has been made to open this 
black box. The unified theoretical framework may shed some light on it. For a stimulus to 
produce any priming effect (Higgins, 1996), people have to attend to some of its features 
(step 1); the attended features activate some stored knowledge (step 2), which gets used 
(step 3). Attention may thus be the first gatekeeper that determines which bodily 
experience is going to play a causal role. In basic social cognition, some variables known 
to determine which features of the presented stimulus receive attention are the features’ 
salience, the perceiver’s needs and goals and expectancies, and alternative stimuli in the 




order manipulation, for instance, may be sufficient to influence what aspects of bodily 
experience receive attention and determine the downstream metaphorical effects.  
In the second step, stored knowledge is activated, but only if it is available in 
mind and accessible in context. The same principles may apply to metaphorical effects 
such that individual and cultural differences in metaphorical knowledge (hence its 
availability) and situational differences in metaphorical knowledge accessibility constrain 
which metaphorical mapping get activated and to what extent. 
In the final step, activated knowledge is used, but only if it seems relevant to the 
task and appropriate to use. How it is used further depends on metacognitive experiences 
and lay theories about their meanings (Schwarz & Clore, 1996, 2007). Therefore, even if 
multiple metaphorical mappings are activated, which one and how it is used are going to 
be determined by relevance, appropriateness, metacognitive feeling, and inferred 
meaning.  
The existence of multiple mappings between bodily experiences and metaphorical 
meanings confers complexity and richness to metaphorical thought and language (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980, 1999). At the same time, it presents a problem for psychologists 
interested in discovering the exact mechanisms through which metaphorical effects occur. 
Systematically testing for the mechanisms and determinants in the above examples may 
help solve this problem. It also highlights the theoretical mileage to be gained by 
integrating the basic principles of social cognition with the new insights into the 
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